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Abstract

This article assesses the content, role, and adaptability of subjective beliefs about contract
enforceability in the context of postemployment covenants not to compete (“noncompetes”).
We show that employees tend to believe that their noncompetes are enforceable, even when
they are not. We provide evidence for both supply- and demand-side stories that explain employees’ persistently inaccurate beliefs. Moreover, we show that believing that unenforceable
noncompetes are enforceable likely causes employees to forgo better job options and to perceive that their employer is more likely to take legal action against them if they choose to
compete. Finally, we use an information experiment to inform employees about the enforceability of their noncompete. While this information matters for employee beliefs and prospective behavior, it does not appear to eliminate an unenforceable noncompete as a factor in the
decision to take a new job. We discuss the implications of our results for the policy debate
regarding the enforceability of noncompetes.
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1. INTRODUCTION
How individuals behave in response to law depends on their particular and sometimes mistaken
beliefs about the law’s content, including the probability of enforcement. Under many circumstances,
individuals are likely to have accurate beliefs about the law, such as in economic settings where the
stakes are high and information is easy to access. Contracting may be one such setting. In other environments, however, baseline access to facts can be limited, and information gathering can be costly.
Moreover, we know that a counterparty can sometimes benefit by investing in maintaining an individual’s specific mistaken beliefs (Gabaix and Laibson 2006). For this reason, the extent to which individual beliefs are inaccurate, the reasons they are inaccurate, and the implications of these inaccuracies,
especially when they are systematic, remains an important area of research (Salop and Stiglitz 1977,
Kim 1997, Wilkinson-Ryan 2017, Stantcheva 2020, Jäger et al. 2022). When persistently mistaken beliefs relate to the content of policies or law and are socially costly, interventions designed to disrupt
such an equilibrium may be able to change behavior and improve welfare (Chetty 2015).
In this article, we consider beliefs regarding the legal enforceability of covenants not to compete
(“noncompetes”) and the role such beliefs may play in explaining employee behavior. Noncompetes
are employment provisions that prohibit departing employees from joining or starting a competitor
under certain conditions. Our work is motivated by two recent findings that point to the possible
influence of mistaken beliefs in this domain. First, employers use noncompetes heavily in states that
explicitly refuse to enforce them (Starr et al. 2021, Colvin and Shierholz 2019). Second, noncompetes
appear to influence employee mobility even in states where such provisions are unenforceable (Starr
et al. 2020). While there are several reasons why employers might use and employees might comply
with noncompetes even when employees know that a court will not enforce them (e.g., reputational
harm or disutility from breaking a “promise”), one explanation for these results is that employees have
mistaken beliefs about noncompete policies and that these beliefs matter to their choices. 1
The possibility that employees are systematically uninformed or perversely misinformed about the
law has important implications for the interpretation of existing noncompete research. Nearly all studies of the consequences of noncompetes leverage state-level policy changes to identify the effects of
these provisions, essentially assuming that employees and employers are aware of, understand, and
react to such policy changes. 2 Policy advocates also almost invariably (if implicitly) assume that em-

1 Catherine Fisk (2002) highlights this possibility when she writes: “In California, covenants not to compete have
been unenforceable against employees since 1872. Employers have nevertheless sought to restrict their employees from
working for competitors … presumably counting on the in terrorem value of the contract when the employee does not
know that the contract is unenforceable.” Another possibility is that employees are well informed about the law but
other terms in their contract make any noncompete de facto enforceable (Sanga 2018).
2 Bishara and Starr (2016) review this literature on “enforceability.” See, e.g., Garmaise (2009), Marx et al. (2009),
Samila and Sorenson (2011), Marx et al. (2015), Starr (2019), Kang and Fleming (2020), Balasubramanian et al. (2022),

1
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/231
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3873638

2

Prescott and Starr:

ployees respond rationally to—or at least with awareness of—existing law when navigating noncompete-related choices. In fact, one common starting point has been the view that enforceable noncompetes must be beneficial to both employees and employers (Rubin and Shedd 1981, Posner et al. 2004)
because otherwise they would not agree to such provisions. And yet the potential consequences of
assuming that employees understand the legal ramifications of their noncompetes are significant. For
example, mistaken beliefs about unenforceable noncompetes can be welfare reducing when they inhibit employees from moving to jobs in which they would be more productive. 3 Also, from a policy
perspective, simply prohibiting court enforcement of such clauses—the traditional reform proposal—
is unlikely to be effective if the in terrorem power of noncompetes remains available to employers notwithstanding any such enforcement “ban” (Starr et al. 2020). 4
Our study uses detailed, nationally representative survey data and an information experiment involving 11,505 labor force participants to examine what employees believe about the enforceability of
noncompetes and to identify the causal effects of such beliefs on prospective decisions. 5 We document that employees tend to believe their noncompetes are enforceable regardless of actual noncompete enforceability. Specifically, 70% of employees with unenforceable noncompetes mistakenly believe their noncompetes are enforceable. Moreover, we find that subjective beliefs about the probability that a court will enforce a noncompete, conditional on an employer bringing a lawsuit, are not
even positively correlated with actual enforceability. Surprisingly, and in contrast to the prevailing
assumption, better-educated employees also appear largely misinformed about enforceability (Friedman 1991, Callahan 1985). Our data offer support for both supply- and demand-side hypotheses that
might explain these persistently mistaken beliefs. First, individuals who mistakenly believe their noncompete to be enforceable are less likely to search for employment with a competitor, reducing their

Lipsitz and Starr (2022), and Young (2020). It is also likely that prior research pays scant attention to beliefs about noncompete enforceability because data on employee beliefs are difficult to obtain.
3 While it is beyond the scope of this paper to assess the welfare consequences of noncompetes and noncompete
enforceability generally, it is worth noting that, to the extent noncompete efficiency benefits—including greater investment in or the development of valuable information—depend on a court enforcing such agreements (Rubin and Shedd
1981), unenforceable noncompetes are unlikely to lead to such investments in the first place. This concern dovetails with
research that finds that noncompete enforceability generates training and investment benefits (Starr 2019, Starr et al. 2021,
Jeffers 2019). More broadly, recent empirical work has identified significant negative externalities associated with noncompetes (Starr, Frake, and Agarwal 2019, Johnson, Lavetti, and Lipsitz 2020), implying that the use and enforcement of
noncompetes is not merely a transfer of rights that affects only the contracting parties.
4 Somewhat ironically, proponents of banning noncompete enforcement often make their case by alluding to the lack
of sophistication or bargaining power on the part of employees subject to such provisions. At least with respect to uninformed applicants and employees, it seems optimistic to believe that these individuals will become aware of and be able
to take advantage of subtle changes in state law when they are uninformed about the content or implications of the noncompete clause contained in their employment contract.
5 We use data from the 2014 Noncompete Survey Project, the first nationally representative survey of noncompetes
(Prescott et al. 2016). In previous work using these data, we describe the incidence of noncompetes across the U.S. labor
force (Starr et al. 2021), how noncompetes relate to mobility (Starr et al. 2020), and how noncompetes create externalities even among those not bound by such agreements (Starr, Frake, and Agarwal 2018).
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access to potentially correcting information. Second, we find that employees who do interact with
competitors are actually more likely to believe their noncompete is enforceable, in part because individuals in states that do not enforce noncompetes are more likely to receive “reminders” of their
supposed noncompete obligations from their current employer.
We next establish that mistaken beliefs can be countered by providing employees with accurate
information about the law and, further, that such information causes employees to change their prospective employment mobility decisions. We find that employees with a noncompete update their
beliefs markedly to more closely align with the information they receive—especially employees in
states that do not enforce noncompetes. In this same vein, employees with unenforceable noncompetes report feeling much less constrained by their noncompete after receiving accurate information
about noncompete enforceability in their state. 6 Using our information experiment as an instrument
for an individual’s beliefs about noncompete enforceability, we estimate that believing noncompetes
are enforceable increases the likelihood that an employee anticipates their noncompete would be a
factor in choosing to start or join a competitor by approximately 60 percentage points relative to an
employee who believes noncompetes are unenforceable.
To build on our evidence that an employee’s beliefs about noncompete enforceability influence
whether the employee is willing to pursue or consider a job with their employer’s competitors, we also
assess whether these beliefs might affect (prospective) negotiation over a noncompete provision during contracting as well as the extent to which our results are driven by changes in the perceived likelihood of being sued for violating a noncompete. Among those presently bound by noncompetes, we
find no evidence that believing that a noncompete is enforceable causes employees to be more likely
to negotiate over these provisions. We also estimate that 20–30% of the effect that enforceability
beliefs have on whether a noncompete matters for accepting a new employment offer is attributable
to changes in whether the employee anticipates a subsequent enforcement lawsuit. Nevertheless, we
also find that among employees with unenforceable noncompetes who believe their noncompetes are
unlikely to be enforced and who view the likelihood of being sued as low, 12–25% still consider their
noncompete to be a factor in whether to take a position with a competitor—perhaps because of moral,
reputational, or relational costs from breaking their word.
This research enriches our understanding of (mistaken) beliefs about law (Kim 1997, WilkinsonRyan 2017), “information shrouding” (Gabaix and Laibson 2006), and the use of unenforceable contract terms (Furth-Matzkin 2017, Koszegi 2014, Tirole 2009). It also contributes to the body of work
Interestingly, again, the effects of correcting beliefs in our information experiment appear to be concentrated
among individuals in states that do not enforce noncompetes (versus individuals who initially view noncompetes as unenforceable in states that actually do enforce them). This asymmetry suggests that inaccurate initial beliefs that a noncompete is unenforceable may be driven less by some mistaken understanding about a state’s law than by other beliefs not
affected by the new information—for example, that a lawsuit brought by a former employer is practically unlikely or that
a court would likely find the respondent’s particular noncompete to be unreasonable.
6
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on the behavioral effects of noncompete agreements and related reform proposals. To begin with,
although prior research has documented mistaken beliefs about the law in other settings (e.g., Darley
et al. 2001, Rowell 2017), we find that these mistaken beliefs can persist even when the stakes are
high—i.e., when they operate to limit an employee’s professional opportunities. Moreover, consistent
with firms “shrouding” information on prices to keep consumers in the dark (Ellison and Ellison
2009, Brown et al. 2010), we present evidence that employers may actively reinforce ignorance about
the law when it benefits them. 7 Mistaken beliefs may also be self-reinforcing if employees who believe
their noncompetes are enforceable simply opt out of searching for jobs with competitors. Second, we
show that mistaken beliefs about enforceability explain at least some of the behavioral response of
employees to unenforceable noncompetes (Sullivan 2009, Fisk 2002). Alternative theories, such as concern about reputation or the moral or relational costs of breaking a promise, also appear to have some
merit (MacLeod 2007). One implication of these findings is that existing studies that exploit bans on
noncompetes (Balasubramanian et al. 2022, Lipsitz and Starr 2022, Fallick et al. 2006) likely understate
the effects of noncompetes themselves because some employees continue to adhere to newly unenforceable noncompetes (Starr et al. 2020). Third, given that beliefs and prospective decisions change
when we supply people with information about the law, our research implies that educational campaigns as a form of regulation offer some promise—more effective, perhaps, than statutes that simply
render noncompetes unenforceable in court. Alternatively, policymakers may succeed with laws that
directly target the use of noncompetes, such as penalties for use or garden leave obligations. 8
We organize the remainder of our article as follows: In Section 2, we review relevant literature—
particularly research exploring ignorance about the law, the consequences of this ignorance, the surprisingly common use of unenforceable contractual provisions, and their behavioral effects—and motivate our particular research questions and hypotheses. In Section 3, we introduce our survey data
and our empirical design. Section 4 presents the results of our empirical work. In Section 5, we conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for reform and future research.
2. RELATED LITERATURE AND RESEARCH MOTIVATION
Despite the common casual assumption that people either correctly gauge the content of the law
from the get-go or that they will otherwise quickly self-correct whenever it matters (i.e., when they
have an incentive to get things right), mistaken beliefs about law appear to be common and to have
7 While we focus in this paper on noncompetition agreements, our results also have implications for other policies
and provisions that limit within-industry mobility of employees, including the inevitable disclosure doctrine (Flammer and
Kacpercyk 2019, Contigiani et al. 2018), trade secret laws (Png 2017), and other restrictive covenants in employment
contracts (Balasubramanian et al. 2021).
8 Garden leave refers to an employer keeping an employee on payroll but away from work obligations during the
prohibition period of a noncompete—i.e., a soon-to-be-former employee is compensated to tend their proverbial garden
(see Oregon Revised Statutes 653.295) while they wait out their noncompete term, after which they are free to work for
their prior employer’s competitors.
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serious ramifications. For example, Kim (1997) finds that job-seekers overwhelmingly overestimate
the legal protections afforded by default (at-will) employment contracts. Mistaken beliefs of this sort
are especially relevant to our work. In contrast to some consumer settings where the consumer’s interest is modest and protecting oneself requires near-constant (unrealistic) vigilance, an employment
relationship is central to many people’s lives, the stakes are high, and there are relatively few salient
and predictable points in time (e.g., hiring, promotion) when employment contract terms are negotiated and resolved. Thus, good reasons exist to predict that people will “read the fine print” of employment contracts. Yet Kim’s study reveals that employees enter into employment relationships systematically misinformed about the extent of their protection from discharge. Kim’s research also implicitly undermines an alternative theory that justifies the at-will rule as a reflection of the parties’
preference for internal, non-contractual norms to prevent welfare-reducing terminations.
Kim (1997) identifies a particular legal doctrine about which most employees are mistaken, but
her finding is no anomaly: other empirical research confirms that systematic mistakes about the content of law are a general phenomenon. Some of this work also makes progress at sketching the mechanisms that might explain the direction and character of these mistakes. Darley et al. (2001) survey
respondents across four states on four areas of law, explicitly testing whether people are aware of any
“minority” rules that apply to them in their jurisdictions. They find that respondents in minority- and
majority-rule states do not differ in their subjective beliefs about the content of law, indicating that
mistakes may be the result of reasonable “best guess” estimates across jurisdictions with different laws.
(This interpretation is consonant with the direction of mistaken beliefs in our data.) Darley et al. also
uncover support for the idea, aligning with Kim (1997), that mistaken views of what the law is can be
driven by beliefs about what the law should be. Rowell (2017) likewise finds that normative beliefs about
what the law should be are better predictors of beliefs about the content of law in some areas than the
“true” content of law. 9 Rowell also detects varying degrees of informedness across six states regarding
ten relevant state laws, from relatively high (the requirement to file an income tax return) to relatively
low (a constitutional right to a clean environment). Rowell fails to discover any relationship between
the perceived importance of the law and the accuracy of respondents’ beliefs, again consistent with
the existence of systematic mistakes about weighty legal issues (Kim 1997). 10
9 There is evidence that cuts against this view, however; at least in some contexts, legal intuitions do not seem to
align with normative intuitions (Furth-Matzkin and Sommers 2020).
10 Other studies examine the problem of inadequate knowledge among actors who seek to assert their legal rights or
entitlements. For example, in another context, Grisso (1980) empirically measures the capacity of juveniles to understand
their Miranda rights and finds, overwhelmingly, that they could not understand these protections. Grisso contends that
the law should adapt to this widespread confusion by developing a per se rule excluding juvenile waivers. Other studies,
exposing similarly widespread misapprehensions about rights, maintain that governments can improve understanding of
the law by simply enhancing “notice.” For instance, Tymchuk et al. (1986) finds that user-friendly methods like the use
of large print or videos can increase comprehension of patient rights by the elderly. Similarly, DeChiara (1995) argues
that requiring employers to disseminate more and better legal information may reduce employee ignorance relating to
their right to bargain.
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These studies point to two conclusions. First, people are broadly misinformed about important
areas of the law, including laws that affect them directly. Second, the direction of mistaken beliefs may
not be arbitrary but a function of views about what the law should be or of what seems most familiar.
One implication of these conclusions is that people’s beliefs, and potentially their behavior, can be
shaped, either unintentionally or with a particular purpose in mind. Relatedly, Stolle and Slain (1997),
Hoffman and Ryan (2013), Wilkinson-Ryan (2015), Wilkinson-Ryan (2017), Furth-Matzkin and Sommers (2020), and Furth-Matzkin (2019), among others, demonstrate that actors can strategically influence beliefs about law and related behavior, showing in experimental settings that the inclusion of
erroneous law (specifically, unenforceable provisions) in contracts and leases (or manipulating whether
people believe they are a party to a contract or a lease with similar language) can deter individuals from
exercising their actual legal rights—rendering them “demoralized by contractual fine print” (FurthMatzkin and Sommers 2020). 11
Research also indicates that the inclusion of terms in formal contracts in particular (as opposed
to, say, an online policy containing the same information) influences people’s beliefs about the enforceability of the terms in question and deters action that conflicts with these beliefs (WilkinsonRyan 2017). In a lab experiment close in flavor to our own research in a real-world employment setting,
Wilkinson-Ryan (2017) studies whether exposing individuals to information at odds with contract
language can counter mistaken beliefs about the presumptive enforceability of contract terms. She
shows that giving individuals information that a court previously held a term in a contract to be unenforceable reduces an individual’s beliefs that the same term in their contract will be enforced. But
without such guidance there is considerable scope for sophisticated parties to generate and take advantage of mistaken beliefs about the law and, specifically, the enforceability of unenforceable terms
in contracts. Darley et al.’s (2001) findings hint that such manipulation will likely be easier to accomplish when unenforceable terms are actually enforceable in many or most other places.
Together, these lines of research imply that employers in jurisdictions where noncompetes are
unenforceable may nonetheless include them in their employment contracts, and that employees may
be likely to hold inaccurate beliefs about noncompete enforceability (and guide their behavior at least
in part on the basis of these inaccurate beliefs)—though the character of any such mistakes is unclear
It is now well established that the use of unenforceable contractual provisions is anything but rare. In the noncompete setting, Prescott et al. (2016) and Starr et al. (2021) demonstrate that noncompetes are virtually as common in
jurisdictions that do not enforce noncompetes as they are in jurisdictions that do enforce them. Furth-Matzkin’s (2017)
seminal work in the residential lease context shows that this finding is no fluke. In Boston, she finds widespread inclusion of either misleading or flat-out invalid terms within these lease agreements. Her work confirms empirically, at least
in the residential lease context, what the literature had long contemplated: that offerors have much to gain and little to
lose by including beneficial yet unenforceable terms (Kuklin 1988). Furth-Matzkin’s more recent work (including with
Sommers) establishes that “gain” is the more likely outcome, with unenforceable terms apparently influencing beliefs
and behavior in experimental settings involving consumer scenarios. In related work, Hoffman and Strezhnev (2022)
offer a different explanation to explain the existence of unenforceable terms. Our work here extends this literature to
real-world, long-term employment contracts/relationships and future mobility intentions.
11
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ex ante. If employees generally take noncompetes to be unfair, they may view them as unenforceable.
Alternatively, because any noncompete is part of an employment contract, and because most states
do enforce noncompetes, the typical employee in a state where noncompetes are unenforceable may
nevertheless assume that employers in their state can lawfully enforce such provisions.
The potential benefits to employers of using unenforceable noncompete provisions when employees may mistakenly assume they are enforceable call to mind profitable “information shrouding” by
firms under conditions of costly information acquisition (Salop and Stiglitz 1977, Gabaix and Laibson
2006). In these models, firms take advantage of consumers’ inaccurate beliefs and avoid debiasing
them. Mistaken consumer beliefs can give retailers some degree of market power; the costs of obtaining correct information from the market prevent consumers from switching to another seller. In our
context, employers wield “monopsony” power (Manning 2020). The cost of uncovering accurate information about enforceability may prevent employees from contravening unenforceable restrictions,
allowing employers to reduce turnover and inhibit labor market competition with competitors. For
instance, if the prevailing industry wage were to rise, employees who rely on the mistaken beliefs that
their noncompete is enforceable when it is actually unenforceable will be less likely to take advantage
of better outside options (Johnson, Lavetti, and Lipsitz 2020).
Extensive research indicates that unenforceable noncompetes are very common (Prescott et al.
2016, Colvin and Shierholz 2019, Starr et al. 2021, Balasubramanian et al. 2021), and Starr et al. (2020)
find that unenforceable noncompetes affect employee mobility. These two findings suggest that noncompetes operate through channels other than actual enforceability. Below, we test whether mistaken
beliefs about enforceability at least partially explain these two patterns. 12 Additionally, we seek to understand why, in the noncompete context, mistaken beliefs about the law appear to be persistent,
focusing both on employee-side behaviors that may insulate or even reinforce inaccurate beliefs and
employer-side behaviors that aim to keep employees misinformed. We also assess the consequences
for beliefs, predictions, and intentions of directly providing employees with relevant and accurate information on noncompete enforceability in their jurisdiction. 13 All of this matters because the strategic
(or just lazy, form-driven) use of unenforceable provisions may be quite socially costly in the context

Of course, there are alternative explanations. First, employees may not be mistaken about their noncompete being
unenforceable and yet may comply because of the reputational or relational costs of not following through on their “promise” (MacLeod 2007). Second, even if there are no reputational consequences, employees may not violate a noncompete
they know to be unenforceable because of some subjective cost of breaking one’s word (Sullivan 2009, Fried 2015). We are
able to separate out these competing theories to some degree in our information experiment based on whether and how
receiving accurate information changes behavior. An employee’s decision to continue to adhere to a noncompete after
learning that noncompetes are unenforceable indicates that something beyond “enforceability” is driving compliance.
13 In doing so, we extend Wilkinson-Ryan’s (2017) research by evaluating the impact of providing a more reformfriendly summary of settled state law about entire categories of provisions rather than a past court case finding a particular hypothetical term unenforceable.
12
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of noncompete agreements (Sullivan 2009). 14 At the very least, unenforceable noncompetes may inhibit productivity-enhancing employee mobility without providing the proper incentives for employers to make investments in employees (Rubin and Shedd 1981). Accordingly, evidence that speaks to
the potential value of an information campaign to reduce or eliminate mistaken beliefs about enforceability may be of particular policymaking significance.
3. SURVEY DATA AND ENFORCEABILITY MEASURES
Our data come from a proprietary survey that we developed and implemented in 2014 to examine
the use and consequences of noncompetes in the U.S. (Prescott et al. 2016). 15 The sample population
consists of individuals aged 18 to 75 who are either unemployed or employed in the private sector or
in a public healthcare system. The full sample comprises 11,505 respondents drawn from all states,
industries, occupations, and other demographic categories. 16 Using these data, Starr, Prescott, and
Bishara (2021) provide the first systematic evidence on the incidence of noncompetes across the U.S.
labor force, finding that noncompetes bind roughly one in five labor force participants. Starr, Prescott,
and Bishara (2020) add by demonstrating how noncompetes can and do influence the process of
employee mobility, independent of whether noncompetes are actually enforceable.
To examine what employees believe about noncompete enforceability and the consequences of
violating their noncompete, as well as how those beliefs matter to their forward-looking intentions
and expectations, we take advantage of several novel aspects of our survey data. First, we analyze
employees’ beliefs about whether, if they took a job with a competitor and their prior employer sued
them for violating their noncompete, a court would ultimately enforce their noncompete. 17 Second,
we examine the results of an information experiment that we built into our survey in which we informed a random selection of respondents of the actual noncompete enforcement policies of their
state. In our view, our information experiment can be taken as a rough simulation of an educational
Sullivan (2009) reviews how the approach courts take toward unenforceable noncompete clauses encourages their
use by employers. Courts, Sullivan argues, seek to do justice among the parties before them and often construe these
clauses in ways that strike the unenforceable portions but salvage the contract as a whole, leaving the contract drafter no
worse off. He argues that this approach by courts does little to address the actual problem of these unenforceable provisions: the in terrorem deterrence of the many who view these terms in these contracts as enforceable.
15 We provide a brief discussion of the data here and refer the interested reader to our Online Appendix for further
information, with an even more detailed description appearing in Prescott et al. (2016).
16 To ensure that the data are nationally representative, we create weights for our analysis using iterative proportional fitting (“raking”) to match the marginal distributions of key variables in the 2014 American Community Survey.
We considered many weighting schemes. See Tables 16 and 17 in Prescott et al. (2016) for more details.
17 We can gauge these beliefs in two ways using our survey data. First, the survey asks, “Are noncompetes enforceable in
your state?” Second, the survey asks respondents to assign a probability that a court would enforce their noncompete were
they to violate it and their employer were to sue: “If you were to quit your current job to work for or start a competing company, how
likely is it that a court would actually enforce your noncompete (assuming your employer took legal action to try to enforce your noncompete)?”
Third, the survey asks respondents to assess how likely their employer is to sue to try to enforce their noncompete: “If
you were to quit your current job to work for or start a competing company, how likely is it that your employer would take legal action to try to
enforce your noncompete?”
14
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campaign or as improved access to legal information, but the experiment also functions as a source of
exogenous variation in beliefs about noncompete enforceability, which allows us to identify the effects
of beliefs about enforceability on prospective behavior.
To study how beliefs vary by noncompete enforceability—and to implement our information experiment—we build a measure of actual enforceability using contemporaneous state noncompete policies (Beck 2014), 18 which captures the conditions under which states will (and will not) enforce noncompetes, including any exemptions under state law. We summarize these dimensions in Table OA1, 19
which shows which states have adopted which policies and the score that each policy receives in our
overall measure. In the table, we report policy variation with respect to 1) how states treat overbroad
noncompete clauses, 2) whether states enforce noncompetes when an employer terminates an employee without cause, and 3) whether noncompetes require additional consideration beyond continued
employment. For each policy, a score of “1” is associated with the highest likelihood that a court will
enforce a noncompete coming before it (e.g., even scenarios in which an employer terminates the
employee without cause), and “0” is associated with the lowest likelihood that a court will enforce a
noncompete. We then add a fourth dimension: whether the state will enforce noncompetes at all (the
three states that essentially do not enforce at all are California, North Dakota, and Oklahoma). Next,
we aggregate across all four measures for each state, such that the maximum score a state can receive
is “4” for robust enforceability. Finally, we take into account any exemptions associated with specific
professions (e.g., physicians) in the state (meaning that employees with different occupations in the
same state may have different enforceability measures) and divide by the maximum score possible for
each state. Thus, the final score for each respondent is between “0” and “1.” 20
For purposes of this article and in our analysis, we classify state-occupation combinations with a
score of “0” as “no enforceability,” scores between “0” and “1” as “medium enforceability,” and
scores of “1” as “high enforceability.” Table 1 shows which states (and state-occupations) fall into
each category and provides summary statistics across the full sample and the sample of individuals
with a noncompete, which will be our focus in most of our analyses. In Figure OA1, we present a
map of the U.S. shaded according to the level of enforceability.

See our Online Appendix C for the exact documentation in Beck (2014).
The language we use to describe enforceability in Table OA1 with respect to each particular aspect of noncompete policy is also identical to the language we use in our information experiment.
20 If a state does not have a policy on any particular dimension of enforceability (e.g., whether the state will enforce
a noncompete for an employee terminated without cause), we exclude that dimension from the calculation of that state’s
overall index, dividing the state-specific score by the maximum of the non-missing scores for that state. There are other
ways to aggregate these measures into a useful index (see, e.g., Bishara 2011 and Starr 2019), but our approach cleanly
identifies nonenforcing states and does not presume any linear relationships.
18
19
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4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
In this section, we study what individuals believe about the enforceability of their noncompetes,
the accuracy of those beliefs, and why, if at all, employees may be persistently misinformed. We also
describe and report the results from our information experiment, which effectively “shocks” employees’ beliefs with accurate information about noncompete enforceability. We use the experiment not
only to determine whether and how accurate information alters preexisting mistaken beliefs about
noncompete enforceability—as well as to see whether mistaken beliefs can fully account for the behavioral effects of unenforceable noncompetes (Starr et al. 2020)—but also to identify the causal relationship between an employee’s beliefs about enforceability and their future expectations and intentions regarding their noncompete-related behavior. Our various research questions require a range of
empirical tools, so we describe our empirical methods as needed along the way.
4.1 Employee Beliefs about Noncompete Enforceability
To begin, Table 2 tabulates responses to the following survey question: “Non-competition enforcement
policy is determined at what level?” Notwithstanding recent federal noncompete policy proposals (beginning circa 2015) and conversations about regulation by the Federal Trade Commission, noncompete
policies are and historically have been under the purview of states (Bishara 2011). Only 24% of respondents—just four percentage points higher than guessing at random—are aware of the legal primacy of states in this domain. The proportion of respondents who answer correctly in our survey
scales somewhat with education; a larger share of those with education beyond a bachelor’s degree
recognize that noncompetes are enforced at the state level (32%) in comparison to those with less
than a bachelor’s degree (21%). A slightly larger share of those who have a noncompete with their
current employer recognize that state law governs their noncompete (30%) relative to those who are
not bound by a noncompete (23%). Taken together, Table 2 suggests that the majority of employees,
regardless of their education level and even if they are presently subject to a noncompete, are unaware
that noncompete enforceability is state-level policy.
Panel A of Table 3 presents a summary analysis of answers to the following question: “Are noncompetes enforceable in your state?” In the full sample, 59% believe that noncompetes are enforceable,
compared to just 5% who believe that they are unenforceable (which is low, considering that 13% of
the population resides in states that either do not enforce noncompetes) and 37% who report that
they do not know the answer to the question. While there is relatively little heterogeneity across education levels, 76% of those bound by a noncompete believe that noncompetes are generally enforceable, compared to 61% of those who do not have a noncompete (and just 37% of those who are not
sure if they are bound). For each cut of the data, less than 10% of the sample believes that noncompetes are unenforceable, suggesting that the conventional set of beliefs in the population are that
noncompetes are enforceable—especially for those presently subject to one (Wilkinson-Ryan 2017).
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Panel B of Table 3 investigates the accuracy of these beliefs, using our broad classification in which
we treat California, North Dakota, and Oklahoma as the only states that refuse as a policy matter to
enforce noncompetes. 21 We refer to those who report not knowing their state’s law in Panel A as the
“uninformed,” and their proportions are unchanged in Panel B. The “misinformed” are those who
incorrectly estimate noncompete enforceability in their state. They make up 11% of the full sample
and 13% of those presently bound by noncompetes. 22 In contrast, the “informed”—those who correctly estimate noncompete enforceability in their state—amount to 53% of the population and 67%
of those working under noncompetes. The apparently high proportion of “informed” employees may
be illusory and just a function of chance and the relevant shares; most states happen to enforce noncompetes, and the majority of employees appear to believe that their states will enforce noncompetes.
The proportion could simply be the result of individuals going with what they sense is the “majority”
rule and just happening to be correct most of the time (Darley et al. 2001).
Figure 1 depicts the level of employee “informedness” about the law among individuals with a
noncompete according to actual state policies, where the “no enforceability” states are those that
entirely deny enforcement for all categories of employees (i.e., California, North Dakota, and Oklahoma) and where medium/high enforceability states are the complement. The figure shows that while
74.8% of those with a noncompete in states that enforce noncompetes are informed, 70.2% of those
with a noncompete in states that do not enforce noncompetes are misinformed (8.4% are uninformed). Figure 2 presents these patterns by education level (among those affirmatively bound by a
noncompete). While highly educated employees appear to be slightly better informed in states that do
not enforce noncompetes, more than 70% of those with above a bachelor’s degree are either misinformed (64.6%) or uninformed (6.5%). Taken together, Table 3 and Figures 1 and 2 establish that
employees bound by noncompetes tend to believe that noncompetes are enforceable in their state—
even when they are not—and confirm that this pattern is relatively stable across education levels. 23
We can assess the robustness of these findings by turning to a more nuanced measure of beliefs
about noncompete enforceability that is specific to the employee’s current employment situation. The
survey asks respondents to answer the following question using a scale of 0–100: “If you were to quit
21 We do not incorporate the occupation-specific carve-outs in this measure because the question refers to state law
broadly and is not specific to the respondent’s occupation. Also, it is important to note that these states will enforce
noncompetes incident to the sale of business but not for an employee’s move between employers. Our survey is limited
to employees (we drop self-employed individuals), making this omission less of a concern. Our main continuous measure of enforceability is specific to employee mobility (as opposed to business sales).
22 We classify as misinformed those in California, Oklahoma, or North Dakota who answer that noncompetes are
enforceable and those in the rest of the states who state that noncompetes are not enforceable. Note that not all noncompetes are enforceable even in states that will generally enforce them; the terms of any noncompete in an enforcing
state must still survive the state’s “reasonableness” test before a court will enforce it (Bishara 2011).
23 See Figure OA2 for a cut by occupation, conditional on having more than 20 individual respondents in that occupation in both enforcing and non-enforcing states. Lawyers are the most likely to be aware that their noncompete is unenforceable. However, because these estimates are underpowered, we recommend viewing them with caution.
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your current job to work for or start a competing company, how likely is it that a court would actually enforce your
noncompete (assuming your employer took legal action to try to enforce your noncompete)?” An answer to this question thus provides a continuous and subjective assessment of the employee’s beliefs that a court, if
asked, would enforce their specific noncompete. Figure 3 documents a strong, positive relationship
between this continuous measure of beliefs and the blunt, categorical beliefs we document in Table 3.
The graph plots subjective beliefs as a function of categorical beliefs and whether the employee is
presently bound by a noncompete. Figure 3 shows that employees who believe noncompetes are unenforceable also estimate the likelihood of enforcement in their case to be much lower than those
who believe noncompetes are enforceable, with those who are uncertain falling in the middle (see
Table OA2, columns (1) and (2) for regression results with and without “basic” controls). 24
Using this individual-specific measure of enforceability (i.e., respondent’s beliefs about likely enforcement in their own situation), Figure 4 assesses whether beliefs about enforceability unconditionally correspond with actual enforceability by noncompete status. 25 Generally speaking, if employees
are accurately informed about noncompete enforceability, the lines in Figure 4 should be at least
weakly upward sloping. But the relationships we uncover are relatively flat. Employees with a noncompete believe that a court will enforce their noncompete somewhere between 40% and 46% of the
time, regardless of actual enforceability in their jurisdiction (with the highest estimate of enforceability
coming from those in states that do not enforce noncompetes). Employees without noncompetes report similarly invariant beliefs across jurisdictions, though the levels differ (see columns (3) and (4) of
Table OA2). These figures suggest that, as before, employees living in states where courts would not
countenance their noncompete agreements remain generally unaware of the unenforceability of such
provisions. To explore this pattern more closely, Figure 5 addresses only the noncompete population
to determine whether more highly educated employees are more likely to be informed. As in Figure
2, we find that employees of all education levels seem to be mistaken about the law, at least in states
where noncompetes are unenforceable (see columns (5) and (6) of Table OA2). 26

In our regression work, “basic” controls include employee gender, employee education, employee race, a thirddegree polynomial in employee age, the class of the employer (e.g., for-profit), the type of occupation (2-digit SOC), industry (2-digit NAICS), employee class (e.g., hourly vs. salary), hours worked per week, weeks worked per year, the interaction of hours and weeks worked, employer size, whether the employer has multiple establishments, and the log of
number of establishments in the employee’s county-industry. The 95% confidence intervals reflect standard errors clustered at the state level, the level at which courts and legislatures determine noncompete enforcement policy (Abadie et al.
2017). We use the adjective “basic” because, in prior papers using these data, we distinguish between more plausibly exogenous “basic” controls and other “advanced” controls that may be endogenous to the contracting process and therefore potentially problematic to include (Starr et al. 2020, Starr et al. 2021).
25 In contrast to the broad state-level measure of actual enforceability (i.e., do vs. do not enforce) that we use in the
previous section, in this analysis and in all work below that relies on these individual-specific, continuous beliefs, we incorporate the occupation-specific exemptions under the law from Table 1 into the “no enforceability” group.
26 One potential critique of our approach here is that employers with establishments in multiple states could use
noncompetes with choice-of-law clauses incorporating another state’s law. We find no evidence that beliefs about noncompete enforceability vary by whether the employer is a multi-state operation, an employer characteristic that we collect
24

12
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2022
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3873638

13

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 231 [2022]

4.2 The Persistent Inaccuracy of Employee Beliefs
The prior section establishes that employees with unenforceable noncompetes are largely unaware
that courts will refuse to enforce their agreement not to compete. Importantly, employee beliefs are
not random. Descriptively, employee mistakes about enforceability favor mistaken beliefs that unenforceable noncompetes are enforceable rather than beliefs that enforceable noncompetes are unenforceable. Hypotheses that would explain this pattern include 1) the existence of a default presumption
among employees that contracts generally and noncompetes specifically are enforceable and 2) a pervasive inference that any particular noncompete is likely enforceable given that noncompetes are enforceable in a “majority” of jurisdictions (Darley et al. 2001). However, both of these hypotheses fly
in the face of traditional views about the advantages of learning the truth (which seem significant), the
relatively low costs of obtaining freely available information, and the information-diffusing benefits
of labor markets. Employment contracts are high stakes, and employees looking for a new position
will presumably meet potential new employers who do know when a provision is unenforceable. In
this section, we consider two hypotheses—one supply side and one demand side—to explain why
employee beliefs about enforceability may be persistently and asymmetrically inaccurate.
Our supply-side hypothesis is simply that many employees who mistakenly believe their noncompete is enforceable may opt out of searching for a position with a competitor, thereby short-circuiting
the labor market’s ability to correct their mistaken beliefs. To assess this possibility, we study the extent
to which an employee reports searching for jobs at competing firms within the last year (measured on
a scale from 0–10). In the sample of employees with a noncompete, we regress this measure of search
effort on indicators for whether the employee is informed about the law, interacted with actual noncompete enforceability, and employer and employee controls. The results, shown in Figure 6, offer
some support for this hypothesis. Conditional on our basic controls, employees who are informed
that their noncompetes are unenforceable exert 50% more search effort towards competitors relative
to those who are misinformed (mistaken) or uninformed (3.74 vs. 2.48). In contrast, among employees
with enforceable noncompetes, we observe little difference between these two groups (see columns
(1) and (2) of Table OA3 for unconditional and conditional model estimates).
An important limitation of this analysis is that it does not exploit any exogenous variation in an
employee’s beliefs or in the accuracy of their beliefs about enforceability. Accordingly, these results
should be interpreted as descriptive; some unobservable factor may exist that affects both how well
informed an employee is about the enforceability of their noncompete and their level of search effort
toward competitors. Reverse causation may also drive the relationship we observe—those who exhibit
more search effort toward competitors may be more likely to learn about the law. While we

using our survey instrument. We classify employees based on the state where they work, however, and we do not know
if their contract invokes another state’s law.
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acknowledge these concerns, our results nevertheless make clear that those who do not know that
their noncompete is unenforceable—approximately 80% of those living in states where noncompetes
are unenforceable per Figure 1—put less effort into searching for new positions at competing firms,
necessarily limiting their ability to learn about the law governing their contract from competitors. This
finding reminds us that certain mistakes—even mistakes about the law—may cause agents to refrain
from activities that facilitate error correction and thus can become persistent.
Our demand-side hypothesis emerges from the information-shrouding literature. Employers in
states that do not enforce noncompetes may have relatively weak incentives to inform employees at
competing employers about the lack of enforceability of their noncompetes—even when they wish to
poach these employees. At first blush, this possibility seems counterintuitive. If a competing employer
wants to poach employees with unenforceable noncompetes, one would guess it need only give these
employees offers and inform them that their existing noncompetes are unenforceable. However, such
“informative” recruiting may be either unattractive to the poaching employer or unlikely to succeed
without substantial effort (Gabaix and Laibson 2006). The recruiting employer may not benefit on net
from successfully informing a prospective employee about their noncompete’s unenforceability for
two reasons. For one, once the focal employee appreciates the unenforceability of their noncompete,
the recruiting employer may face greater competition for that employee, who might now be more
open to offers from, for instance, more obvious competitors to their current employer. Moreover, the
recruiting employer may itself use unenforceable noncompetes with its existing employees, who may
also mistakenly believe such provisions are enforceable (as seems likely given Section 4.1). Thus, “informative” recruiting may produce a pyrrhic victory—i.e., higher turnover and wage costs—if the new
hire eventually informs the employer’s entire workforce about the unenforceability of noncompetes
(from the employer’s “own mouth,” as it were). Finally, convincing a prospective employee that their
unenforceable noncompete is actually unenforceable may be too difficult to justify in many cases. For
example, an employee’s current employer may implicitly (or explicitly) threaten potentially departing
employees with litigation by reminding them that they agreed to a noncompete clause (or by actually
suing them), which may render employees more (not less) likely to believe their noncompete is enforceable—perhaps specifically when it is unenforceable.
To assess whether there is potential for competitor recruitment to inform employees about the
law, we exploit two unique aspects of our survey data. The first is an indicator for whether the employee reports receiving a job offer from a competitor in the last year. The second is an indicator for
whether, if an employee’s present employer became aware of the employee’s job offer from a competitor, the employer reminded the employee of their noncompete obligations. Figure 7 displays the
results from a regression using data from noncompete-bound employees, including basic controls, of
employee beliefs regarding the level of noncompete enforceability interacted with whether the employee in question received a job offer from a competitor within the last year. The results furnish some
14
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2022
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3873638

15

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 231 [2022]

support for the demand-side hypothesis: we find that employees who receive offers from competitors
actually believe their noncompetes are enforceable to a somewhat greater degree on average relative
to those who do not receive offers from competitors (55% vs 47%), though the difference is not
statistically significant (see columns (3) and (4) of Table OA3).
Figures 8 and 9 attend to the potential role of strategic reminders by current employers in keeping
employees misinformed about the unenforceability of their noncompete. Figure 8 shows that, comparing two observationally equivalent employees (per our basic controls) who are subject to a noncompete and who have received job offers from competitors, an employee with an unenforceable noncompete is approximately 40 percentage points more likely to receive a reminder about their (unenforceable) noncompete (71% vs 32%, 34%) from their employer. 27 Figure 9 documents that reminders
alone are associated with stronger beliefs about the enforceability of noncompetes, regardless of the
level of enforceability (see columns (1)–(4) of Table OA4). 28 Taken together, Figures 7, 8, and 9 imply
that rather than operating to inform employees when they have an unenforceable noncompete, recruitment activity by competitors—and subsequent reminders or threats from current employers—
may actively prevent employees from learning that their noncompete is unenforceable.
A key limitation of our analysis of noncompete reminders is that relatively few employees with a
noncompete in our sample received offers from competitors that became known to their employer—
which is necessary for their employer to respond to the competing offer by issuing a reminder (237
total observations). To supplement our analysis, we turn to a question in the survey that asks all individuals with a noncompete: “Are you aware of any instances in which your employer sued an employee for violating
a non-competition agreement?” 29 Logically, reminders are a likely precursor to a lawsuit, so knowledge of a
prior lawsuit (or at least a letter threatening legal action) may operate much the same as a reminder in
terms of reinforcing an employee’s beliefs in enforceability. It also reflects the idea that employee
beliefs may respond not only to what the employee experiences personally (as in the reminders analysis) but also to the experiences of their present and former coworkers. Figure OA3 shows that approximately 20–24% of individuals with a noncompete are aware of (or believe they are aware of) their
employer suing others over noncompetes, and this relationship is relatively flat with respect to actual
enforceability (see columns (5) and (6) of Table OA4). Interestingly, however, Figure OA4 shows that
employees who believe their employer has sued former employees are significantly more likely to
believe that their noncompete is enforceable (see columns (7) and (8) of Table OA4), and this effect
appears to be especially pronounced for employees with a noncompete that is actually unenforceable.
27 These results are robust to dropping observations from California. Without data from California, 62.2% of employees still receive reminders about unenforceable noncompetes.
28 Both Figures 8 and 9 graph results from the regression estimates we report in Table OA4.
29 We acknowledge that it is not entirely clear whether respondents interpreted this question as asking whether their
employer actually filed a legal complaint or, alternatively, whether hearing that one or more fellow employees had received a “threatening letter” or other warning would suffice for respondents to answer “yes.”
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Thus, with reminders and hints of (frivolous) lawsuits, employers seem endowed with at least some
ability to convince individuals with an unenforceable noncompete that their noncompete is in fact
enforceable, countering whatever effect competing firms may have if they attempt to disabuse these
employees of their mistaken beliefs about enforceability. 30
4.3 Information Experiment Design and Balance Tests
Whatever the reasons for persistently mistaken beliefs about noncompete enforceability among
employees, an important question is whether effective policy responses exist. Policymakers might deter employers from using unenforceable noncompetes by imposing financial penalties for their use or
by requiring compensation during any noncompete prohibition period (i.e., garden leave). An alternative, possibly more effective solution to inaccurate beliefs about enforceability is an educational campaign—such as the regular posting of employee contractual rights and information at the workplace
or elsewhere—and mandatory legal disclosures that are comprehensible, easy to verify, and conspicuous. There is considerable debate over the value of disclosures as a means of positively influencing
behavior. Ben-Shahar and Schneider (2011), for example, describe many of the drawbacks—indeed
the harms—of such an “educational approach,” and yet other work, for example, Wilkinson-Ryan
(2017), Furth-Matzkin (2019), and Furth-Matzkin and Sommers (2020), finds clear benefits. To gauge
the potential effects of providing accurate information to employees about enforceability, we simulate
a (rough) disclosure policy for correcting mistaken beliefs via an information experiment within our
survey. Researchers use this empirical strategy in many contexts. Recent studies, for example, examine
the impact of information on business economic expectations over time (Coibion et al. 2018), college
major choices (Wiswall and Zafar 2015), and settlement decisions (Sullivan 2016).
Our information experiment analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we assess our respondents’
baseline expectations about noncompete enforceability (which we describe and analyze at length
above) and how they regard the effects of any noncompete on their behavior. Next, we randomly
assign approximately 50% of respondents (50.1% and 52.43% of the unweighted full and noncompete
samples, respectively) to receive legal information about the actual enforceability of noncompetes,
individualized for a given respondent based on their state of employment. Finally, we reevaluate their
beliefs about the enforceability of noncompetes and the potential influence of these provisions on the
respondent’s behavior by re-administering questions from the first stage of the information experiment—even to those who do not receive the information treatment. 31

30 An employer bringing a lawsuit to enforce a clearly unenforceable term can, at least in some jurisdiction, be subject to a countersuit on the part of the employee for unfair labor practices (as in California). However, taking advantage
of this right of action can be costly and risky for an employee, leaving employers at least some room to posture in a way
that might reduce mobility that conflicts with the terms of a noncompete.
31 By asking those who do not receive information the same questions, we can alleviate concerns that those in the
treatment group are changing their answers simply because they must answer the same questions twice.
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We gather the specific information about the law that we supply to respondents in the experiment
from the characterization of state-level noncompete regimes contained in Beck (2014), which we provide in some detail in Online Appendix C. We summarize these laws in Table OA1. We outline the
actual information that we present to those who receive information (treatment) in Figures OA5 and
OA6. In the survey, the information appears in the order indicated in those figures. Figure OA5 explains that noncompete policy is designed and enforced at the state level and that only a few states do
not enforce such provisions. 32 It also describes the typical reasonableness test that state courts employ
when they decide whether to enforce a noncompete in a particular case. Figure OA6 displays all of
the state-specific information the survey delivers to respondents, where the blue arrows indicate our
experiment’s “display logic” by which we ensure that we introduce only appropriate information (depending on the state in which the respondent works) to respondents as part of the treatment (see
Table OA1 to link specific policies to individual states). 33
In Table 4, we present the results of a balance test to verify that individuals with a noncompete
are balanced between treatment and control groups, both overall and within each of the state enforceability levels. With the exception of the gender variable—men are five percentage points more likely
to be in the group that receives information (and the medium enforceability category drives this difference)—there are no statistically significant differences between the (unweighted) treatment and
control groups in the full sample or any subsample.
4.4 Information Effects on Employee Beliefs
Figure 10 reports the distribution of beliefs among individuals with a noncompete across the treatment and control groups—i.e., according to whether the individual receives information on actual
noncompete enforceability in their state. The top row of Figure 10 shows, not surprisingly but reassuringly, that the distributions of beliefs before and after the experiment among those who do not
receive any information are nearly identical. In contrast, for those who receive information in the “no
enforceability” group, we observe a large leftward shift in the distribution of beliefs. This swing indicates that employees can actually read and absorb the information in our treatment. In medium and
high enforceability states, we see slight shifts rightward in the distribution. Figure 11 presents the
simple mean effects corresponding to the post-experiment beliefs by treatment status (corresponding
In Figure OA5, we only list California and North Dakota as nonenforcing states. This is discordant with Beck
(2014), which includes Oklahoma as a nonenforcing state. We exclude Oklahoma from Figure OA5 because, in the literature, we found competing views on whether Oklahoma is truly a nonenforcing state in 2014 (see Bishara 2011). Nevertheless, we include Beck’s (2014) characterization in the state-specific information we provide regarding Oklahoma. As a
result, employees in Oklahoma (we only have 118 such individuals in the full sample—of whom only 13 indicate having
a noncompete) may be undertreated by our experimental choices.
33 We made one error in carrying out our information experiment. According to Beck (2014), Alabama does not
enforce noncompetes for professionals. Our information experiment unintentionally excludes that information. There
are only 25 respondents with a noncompete from Alabama, although 12 of these are professionals. Fortunately, this error does not materially influence our results.
32
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to regression results in Table OA5 columns (1) and (2)). Consistent with Figure 10, we find that those
who receive information that their noncompete is unenforceable are far less likely to believe that their
noncompete is enforceable (24%) relative to those who do not receive information (46%). These
effects appear muted for the medium and high enforceability groups. Taken together, Figures 10 and
11 demonstrate that information delivery is most effective at changing beliefs among those with an
entirely unenforceable noncompete, which is the population entertaining the bulk of mistaken beliefs
in this domain. Notably, providing information that noncompetes are unenforceable—at least as we
do in our experiment—does not completely free the informed from their mistaken beliefs.
Importantly, the raw distributions and mean effects we present in Figures 10 and 11 may mask
heterogeneity in whether and how much respondents update their beliefs after the experiment relative
to their initial beliefs. Figure 12 addresses this issue by presenting an unconditional binned scatterplot of
the relationship between pre-experiment beliefs and post-experiment beliefs (Starr and Goldfarb
2020). If respondents estimate the same level of enforceability before and after receiving information,
their responses would line up along the 45-degree line (shown in thick black in Figure 12). Matching
estimates along the 45-degree line is primarily what we observe for those who do not receive information, regardless of the level of actual enforceability (left panel of Figure 12). In contrast, Figure 12’s
right panel indicates that those who receive information update differently given initial beliefs and actual
enforceability. For example, respondents who initially estimate their noncompete to be enforceable
with certainty reduce their post-experiment beliefs considerably: those with an unenforceable noncompete reduce their estimate to approximately 35%, while those in medium and high enforceability
states reduce their beliefs to 75–80%. These latter shifts imply that accurate and precise information
even for medium and high enforceability states may give employees some doubt that their noncompete can or will be enforced. We see a similar pattern among those who initially view their noncompete
as largely unenforceable—these individuals update their beliefs upward, especially if they live in a state
where noncompetes are moderately or easily enforceable.
Figure 13 characterizes the mean effects of information on beliefs among individuals with a noncompete that we document in Figure 12 by splitting the sample by pre-experiment beliefs above or
below the median (50%) and then regressing post-experiment beliefs on a treatment indicator that we
interact with actual enforceability and basic controls (see Table OA5 columns (3) and (4)). The results
show that the drop in mean beliefs in Figure 11 is almost entirely attributable to the changing beliefs
of those who initially view their noncompete as enforceable. For example, for those with above-median pre-experiment beliefs about enforceability in their state, information receipt causes beliefs to fall
from 81% to 26% when their noncompete is actually unenforceable, and even causes drops of 8–10
percentage points in medium and high enforceability states. In contrast, those who initially believe

18
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2022
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3873638

19

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 231 [2022]

their noncompete is unenforceable (left panel of Figure 13) are largely unmoved by the information—
even in medium and high enforceability states. 34
4.5 Information Effects on Prospective Employee Behavior
In this section, we examine whether the delivery of accurate information about noncompete enforceability produces changes in an employee’s prospective mobility behavior. Unfortunately, we are
unable to track employee decisions or behavior over time. Instead, we estimate an employee’s very
short-run reaction to exposure to enforceability information using their answers to questions that
appear after the experimental treatment in the survey. We cannot know whether the outcomes we
study below will ever translate to actual changes in mobility at some point in an employee’s future.
However, it is reasonable to assume that changes in prospective mobility outcomes are a necessary
precursor to behavioral change. 35 In other words, if information has no apparent effect on an employee’s expectations or predictions, it seems unlikely to matter to actual behavior. Moreover, because
our information treatment is less polished and credible than a professionally designed educational
campaign would be, our assumption is that our estimates are conservative.
To collect a broad measure of how a noncompete might influence employee mobility, our survey
presents respondents with the following question both before and after our experimental treatment:
“If you received a much better offer from a comparable, competing employer, would your noncompete be a factor in
preventing you from moving?” (Starr et al. 2020). In Figure 14, we calculate how responses to this question
differ depending on treatment status and the level of enforceability. 36 For individuals with an unenforceable noncompete, 51% of those who do not receive information indicate that their noncompete
would be a factor in whether they would accept the job offer, versus 26% among those who receive
accurate information about lack of enforceability. For individuals with a moderately enforceable noncompete, the difference is smaller (46% vs 38%), while there is no difference for those with a highly
enforceable noncompete. Figure 15 breaks out this analysis based on individual responses to this same
question before the experiment, conditional on basic controls (see Table OA6 columns (3) and (4)).
In the right panel, we find that individuals who initially report that their noncompete would be a factor
in leaving their current employer but who live in a state where noncompetes are actually unenforceable
experience the largest drop to 51%. Notably, the control group (which does not receive information)
34 Figure OA7 shows the same heterogeneity for the sample of employees not bound by a noncompete. Those who
receive information and mistakenly believe pre-treatment that any noncompete would have been enforceable (had they
agreed to one in their current job) also dramatically update their beliefs about enforceability (right panel). In contrast to
the sample of individuals with a noncompete, however, those who mistakenly believe any noncompetes would not have
been enforceable also update their beliefs moderately when those noncompetes are highly enforceable (left panel).
35 Anecdotally, several of the survey participants who received information thanked us at the end of the survey for
letting them know that their noncompete was unenforceable. This suggests that real learning about the content of the
law in such a format can affect future employment-related decisions.
36 The sample is limited to individuals with a current noncompete, and the underlying regression specification includes basic controls. We report the full results in Table OA6.
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also shifts downward a little as well, suggesting that control respondents answer the question differently the second time. In the left panel, we detect fewer differences by treatment status in the sample
of individuals who initially report that their noncompete would not be a factor. 37
One important and interesting result of this analysis is that, even after employees learn that their
noncompete is unenforceable, many still indicate (in our survey, at least) that they will weigh their
noncompete as a factor in deciding whether to take a better job at a competing employer. This result
implies that while mistaken beliefs about enforceability explain a relatively large portion of how unenforceable noncompetes succeed at deterring employees from taking better jobs, noncompetes—even
unenforceable ones—may influence employee mobility decisions through other channels as well. 38
Formally agreeing to a noncompete, for example, might increase the subjective cost of violating one’s
word, the reputational cost of breaking a nonbinding “promise,” or even the financial cost of defending oneself against a frivolous lawsuit (Sullivan 2009). We return to this issue in Section 4.7.
4.6 Effects of Beliefs about Enforceability on Employee Behavior
In the previous section, we examine the effects of our simple information treatment on (1) beliefs
about noncompete enforceability and on (2) various prospective mobility outcomes. These findings
are relevant to policymaking discussions about how best to correct mistaken beliefs about enforceability and about whether such interventions can influence mobility, either by changing beliefs or
through other mechanisms. In this section, we study the relationship between (1) and (2) directly.
Specifically, we leverage our information treatment to identify the causal effects of beliefs about noncompete enforceability on prospective mobility outcomes (as opposed to the effects of the information treatment itself). If someone believes that their noncompete is more rather than less enforceable, how much does that matter to their prospective mobility decisions? In theory, beliefs about
enforceability might matter very little, if questions about enforceability are absent from an employee’s
mobility-related decision making, perhaps because many other considerations (like reputation) matter
far more. 39 Alternatively, employees may put weight on enforceability in making their mobility decisions, either in the abstract or by breaking down the separate practical facets of “enforceability,” like
whether their employer might sue them if they depart to a competitor or, if a lawsuit does occur,
whether a court would enforce their noncompete. In that case, employee beliefs about enforceability
seem likely to matter to mobility, though how much they might matter remains unclear.
Figures OA8 and OA9 show the same patterns hold for whether a noncompete will be a factor in starting a new
business. The precise question in the survey is: “If you developed an idea to start a new company that competes with your current employer, would your noncompete be a factor in preventing you from starting the competing firm?”
38 We acknowledge that one concern with this conclusion is that our respondents (in the right panel) initially state
affirmatively that their noncompete would be a factor in deciding whether to leave their employer for one of its competitors, whereas in a real-world educational campaign, no preliminary mental choice would be required. Therefore, any
post-educational choice would not be a “change” from a prior position.
39 Of course, this possibility seems remote, given the results we report in Section 4.5.
37
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To study the relationship between beliefs about noncompete enforceability and employee mobility
decisions, we could simply check to see whether one correlates with the other. Controlling for observables, for instance, we might find that an employee’s beliefs that their noncompete is enforceable are
positively correlated with an employee’s reporting that their noncompete would be a factor in their
decision to leave for a competitor. This approach suffers from endogeneity concerns, however. For
example, relatively sophisticated employees may be both more likely to believe that noncompetes are
unenforceable (because such employees may be more knowledgeable about the law in jurisdictions
where noncompetes are unenforceable) and more likely to attract outside offers. Another possibility
is that relatively mobile employees who have had many conversations with friends about transitioning
to other jobs may be more likely to have accurate beliefs about enforceability—i.e., low or at least
lower estimates of enforceability in states where noncompetes are unenforceable.
Due to these endogeneity concerns, we use an instrumental variable approach that exploits the
fact that the information experiment exogenously causes employees to update their beliefs about noncompete enforceability. The idea is that randomly deploying information causes some employees to
update their beliefs when their initial beliefs are wrong, as in Figure 13. Accordingly, we instrument
for post-experiment beliefs with a set of instrumental variables that capture the main effect of the
information experiment and its interaction with the actual enforceability of the respondent’s noncompete and an indicator for the respondent’s pre-experiment beliefs about enforceability (above or below
50%). 40 Figure 13 (which effectively reports the first-stage 2SLS estimates) reveals that the compliant
subpopulation driving any local average treatment effects is primarily individuals who have an unenforceable noncompete but who initially believe their noncompete is enforceable. The identifying assumption underlying these instruments is that the information shock affects mobility only through its
effects on beliefs about the enforceability of noncompetes. In our view, this assumption seems at least
plausible because the content of the information relates only to the circumstances under which a court
in their state would enforce a noncompete. That is, it is difficult to conceive of a reasonable way in
which new information about the content of law would affect mobility through some channel that
does not depend on a change in what individuals believe about the law. 41

This approach produces four total instruments: (1) receipt of information; (2) receipt of information×pre-experiment beliefs; (3) receipt of information×actual enforceability; (4) receipt of information×pre-experiment beliefs×actual
enforceability. Note that we include the respondents’ pre-experiment beliefs, actual state law, and the interaction of these
two variables as controls in the 2SLS model.
41 In Section 4.7, we explore one potential mechanism for how changing beliefs about enforceability might influence
mobility—through changing beliefs about the likelihood of an employer filing a lawsuit. We acknowledge that there may
be other ways that changing beliefs can affect mobility outcomes and that some of these scenarios might not be particularly policy relevant. One possibility is that the information in our experiment might engender an emotional response in
respondents, such as anger, because they learn that their employer has been threatening them over an entirely unenforceable contract, which may then cause them to be more likely to want to leave their employer as they continue with the
survey. While this anger response only arises because the information treatment changes these individuals’ beliefs about
40
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Table 5 documents the 2SLS results for a variety of relevant behavioral outcomes. Columns (1)–
(3) examine whether beliefs that a noncompete is enforceable cause an employee to conclude that
their future job options are limited and whether an employee’s noncompete would be a factor in
deciding to take a better job or start a competing enterprise. In all cases, we find that believing that a
noncompete is enforceable causes a sizable increase in feelings that the noncompete limits job opportunities. These estimates are also quite large in magnitude. For example, an employee who believes
their noncompete is enforceable with certainty is 43 percentage points more likely to feel like their
noncompete limits their future job options (186% of the sample mean) and 66 percentage points more
likely to report their noncompete would be a factor in joining a competitor (159% of the sample mean)
relative to an employee who does not believe their noncompete is enforceable. 42
If believing that a noncompete is enforceable causes employees to forgo job opportunities (at least
prospectively), an important question is whether these ex post consequences might lead at least some
employees to negotiate over the terms of their noncompete or to seek other benefits in exchange for
agreeing not to compete. That is, if employees who believe their noncompete is enforceable are more
likely to see their noncompete as limiting their job opportunities in the future, do they negotiate in the
hope of obtaining some compensating differential up front? Starr et al. (2021) find that only 10% of
workers overall negotiate over the terms of their noncompete, 43 so large effects seem unlikely, unless
most or many of these bargaining employees were to live in states that do not enforce noncompetes.
In Figure 16, we show that, comparing observationally equivalent individuals with a noncompete, the
likelihood that people report negotiating over their noncompete does not differ dramatically across
states that do and do not enforce noncompetes. 44 Column (4) of Table 5 reports IV results for the
effects of beliefs in noncompete enforceability on negotiation expectations. Consistent with Figure
the law’s content (otherwise, why an angry response?), such a mechanism may only operate in environments in which
some employers engage in actively misleading their employees in equilibrium.
42 Table OA7 explores the robustness of these relationships by exploiting answers to a series of questions about the
importance of various factors in an employee’s decision whether to move to a comparable competing company. Columns (1), (2), and (3) show that believing that a noncompete is enforceable increases the importance of the employee
simply having a noncompete, the importance of the possibility their employer will sue to enforce the noncompete, and
the importance of the likelihood that the court will enforce it. Columns (4), (5), and (6) examine how beliefs about noncompete enforceability change the relative importance of entering into a noncompete as compared to a range of employment amenities. In each specification, believing that a court would enforce a noncompete following litigation causes an
employee to more heavily weight the importance of agreeing to a noncompete relative to job amenities such as compensation, lifestyle benefits, or opportunities for greater prestige or training.
43 Rothstein and Starr (2022) find that employees with a noncompete do not appear more likely to bargain over
wages, conditional on employee and employer characteristics, though they have relatively higher wages.
44 Figure OA10 examines whether an information treatment might lead employees to update their estimate of the
likelihood that they would negotiate in the future over noncompetes. While there is an enormous difference in levels
between Figure 16 (which reflects actual reported negotiation behavior) and Figure OA10 (which reflects prospective
negotiation behavior), the information treatment does not appear to differentially cause individuals to change their negotiation predictions relative to the control group. A likely reason that the mean levels of negotiation are different is that
the second question asks about whether the employee would negotiate over a noncompete as opposed to whether those
with a noncompete actually negotiated over their current noncompete.
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16, we detect no evidence that believing noncompetes are enforceable causes employees to change
their negotiating patterns—at least for those bound by noncompetes. This set of results calls into
question freedom-of-contract arguments often made in favor of enforcing noncompetes—that applicants and employees are rational and reasonably sophisticated agents with the power to negotiate for
compensating differentials. 45
4.7 Beliefs about the Likelihood of a Lawsuit as a Mechanism
Whether and how such beliefs about the enforceability of noncompetes matter to an employee’s
behavior may depend in part on what the employee believes about the likelihood that their employer
will actually sue them for violating their noncompete in the first place—whether or not a court would
enforce the noncompete. Employers may sue an employee even when a noncompete is unenforceable
simply to force the employee to defend at significant personal cost, and an employer who has an
employee dead to rights for violating an enforceable noncompete may choose not to litigate. In other
words, legal enforceability does not translate one-to-one to the costs and consequences that might
follow from deviating from the terms of a noncompete—distinct beliefs about the practical likelihood
of a lawsuit may be important, too. Furthermore, a noncompete may still matter even when an employee believes it to be unenforceable and further believes that, regardless, their employer would never
attempt to litigate over it. For example, employees may experience moral or reputational costs for
violating the provision’s spirit. We are able to use our rich data to investigate these ideas.
We begin by assessing whether noncompetes appear to influence job mobility choices even when
employees believe both that a noncompete is unenforceable and that, in any event, their employer will
not cause a fuss by litigating the point. Figure 17 considers this question by categorizing employees
based on whether they view their noncompete as enforceable and on whether employees perceive a
lawsuit as likely (based on whether the reported likelihood of litigation is above or below 25%). We
then cut the data by actual noncompete enforceability and further by whether a respondent receives
information on the actual noncompete policies in their state. 46
We uncover two strong patterns, both for those who do and do not receive information. First,
individuals with a noncompete who believe that their noncompete is enforceable and that their employer is likely to sue them for breaching it are much more likely to see their noncompete as a factor
in deciding whether to join a competitor (57%–78% depending on the level of actual enforceability)
45 In contrast, column (5) of Table 5 shows that those who are not bound by a noncompete would be more likely to
negotiate over a new noncompete when they believe it would be enforceable. This shift appears to be driven by the fact
that those not bound by a noncompete report being less likely to negotiate when they receive information about noncompetes being unenforceable (Figure OA11). It is not clear ex ante why these answers differ from the noncompete
sample in both direction and statistical significance. One possibility is that because these employees do not have a noncompete, they may be unfamiliar with the typical contracting process around noncompetes and therefore may make different assumptions about the costs and effectiveness of negotiation.
46 As before, we include our basic controls and cluster standard errors at the state level.
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relative to those who see neither possibility as very likely (5%–25%). Second, even when employees
know that their noncompete is unenforceable in court and do not believe their employer is likely to
sue them anyway if they depart, a non-negligible proportion of employees still view their noncompete
as a factor in deciding whether to accept a competitor’s offer: 12% among those who are informed
about the law and 25% among those who do not receive information. 47 This evidence indicates that
while beliefs about enforceability and the likelihood of an enforcement lawsuit can explain a substantial proportion of the variation in whether employees view their noncompete as a factor in deciding
whether to accept a position with a competitor, other reasons likely remain important in their viewing
a noncompete as an impediment. Two natural explanations, which we unfortunately cannot address
further with our data, are the subjective disutility and the reputational costs of breaking a promise or
otherwise upsetting a relational contract.
This joint analysis of beliefs about court enforcement and beliefs about employer litigation propensity is limited, however, because it treats the two as independent; it ignores the potential for beliefs
about noncompete enforceability to influence beliefs about the likelihood of a lawsuit. It may be, for
instance, believing that noncompetes are legally enforceable causes one to believe that their employer
will sue them for violating one. We examine binned scatterplots in Figure OA12 relating beliefs about
enforceability to beliefs about the likelihood of facing a lawsuit. The left and middle panels reveal an
(unconditional) positive correlation between beliefs about noncompete enforceability and the likelihood of a lawsuit, both before and after the information experiment. The right panel, in turn, shows
that this positive relationship holds within-individual, both for those who do and do not receive information. Because we randomly shock the former group’s beliefs with information, we can interpret
this positive relationship causally. More formally, in column (1) of Table 6, we use the same instrumental variables strategy we deploy in prior sections to examine how a change in beliefs about enforceability causally affects an employee’s perception of the likelihood that their employer will sue
them to enforce their noncompete. The results indicate that an employee who believes with certainty
that their noncompete is enforceable will also believe that their employer is 41.1 percentage points
(106% of the sample mean) more likely to take legal action relative to an employee who is certain
noncompetes are unenforceable. Put another way, employees appear to assume that law at least partially determines employer litigation behavior.
Given that changes in an employee’s beliefs about enforceability cause changes in beliefs about
litigation risk—and that both seem to relate to whether a noncompete will be a factor in an employee’s
decision to transition to a competitor per Figure 17—we next explore to what extent beliefs about the

47 We note that these percentages may be too low when we take into account the fact that answering a survey is not
the same as breaking a promise made to coworkers with whom one has had a long relationship. The latter is likely to be
more socially or morally costly than the former.
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likelihood of a lawsuit mediate the relationship between beliefs about enforceability and mobility intentions. Specifically, we test whether the relationship between beliefs about enforceability and mobility is driven entirely, in part, or not at all by changes in an employee’s beliefs about the possibility
of being sued over their noncompete. Practically speaking, all this requires is that we examine models
both with and without a post-experiment control for the perceived likelihood of a lawsuit.
First, we explore the robustness of our earlier information experiment results to the inclusion of
controls for post-experiment beliefs about the likelihood of an employer lawsuit. We present our
findings in columns (2) and (3) of Table 6. To reiterate our earlier results, we estimate that those who
receive information on the lack of enforceability of their noncompetes are 25 percentage points less
likely to report that their noncompete would be a factor in deciding to leave to work for a competitor.
However, once we hold fixed an employee’s post-experiment beliefs about the likelihood of a lawsuit
in column (3), the estimate falls to 15 percentage points. Thus, changes in employee beliefs about
litigation risk account for 40.5% ((0.252 – 0.150)/0.252) of the overall effect of information about
unenforceable noncompetes. Our analysis also indicates that beliefs about the threat of a lawsuit mediate the effect of information in medium and high enforceability states to a similar degree. We find
that the mere inclusion of the perceived likelihood of a lawsuit causes the interaction between information in medium enforceability states to fall from 0.164 to 0.071, while the interaction between high
enforceability and information falls from 0.256 to 0.171.
We perform one final test to assess how strongly the perceived threat of a lawsuit mediates the
relationship between beliefs about enforceability and behavioral outcomes. Columns (4)–(7) examine
OLS and 2SLS models, comparing whether beliefs about noncompete enforceability relate to whether
a noncompete would be a factor in accepting an offer with a competitor. The OLS specifications
suggest that 32.5% of the overall relationship between beliefs and our prospective mobility measure
can be explained by how much employee beliefs about enforceability drive changes in beliefs about
litigation risk (i.e., the effect of P(Enforce) falls from 0.578 to 0.390 when controlling for P(Lawsuit)).
Columns (6) and (7) report the same analysis, except in those specifications, we use the instrumented
measure for post-experiment beliefs. 48 A similar pattern arises, with the likelihood of a lawsuit accounting for approximately 32.8% of the relationship between beliefs about the law and the extent to
which noncompetes matter for taking a competing job.
Taken together, this section documents three facts regarding how beliefs about a lawsuit relate to
beliefs about enforceability and mobility choices. First, a boost in one’s beliefs that a noncompete is
To perform the mediation analysis in column (7), we follow the Instrumental Variable mediation approach in
equations (10) and (11) of Dippel et al. (2020). As an alternative, we construct the 2SLS estimate in column (7) of Table
6 “by hand” (i.e., taking the predicted values from the first stage and including them in the second stage manually), so
that we can include the beliefs about the likelihood in the second stage but not the first stage With this approach, the
coefficient on post-experiment beliefs falls 18%.
48
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enforceable also increases one’s beliefs that their employer will sue in response to a violation of the
noncompete. Second, perceptions about the likelihood of a lawsuit mediate the relationship between
beliefs about enforceability and mobility outcomes, explaining roughly 20–30% of the overall effect.
Third, a nontrivial minority (12–25%) of those who see it as unlikely that their employer will sue them
and also see it as unlikely that a court will enforce their noncompete still treat their noncompete as a
factor in whether to take a job with a competitor. This last result suggests that being a party to a
noncompete can still have chilling effects on an employee’s mobility decisions, perhaps for reputational or relational reasons, even when the employee assumes a court would not uphold the noncompete and, in any event, the employer would never seek to enforce it.
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this study, we examine the beliefs employees possess about the enforceability of noncompetes,
the accuracy of those beliefs, and how those beliefs influence behavior. We find that employees of all
education levels tend to believe that noncompetes are enforceable even when they are not, a result
that adds to existing work about mistaken beliefs about the law. We study mechanisms that may support persistently mistaken beliefs by circumventing normal pathways for correction. First, employees
who are unaware that their noncompete is unenforceable may opt out of important “corrective” labor
market activity by searching for jobs at competitors less often. We also build on the information
shrouding literature, which emphasizes that firms can benefit from hiding certain pricing information
from consumers, to show that recruiting employers may counterintuitively have reasons to keep applicants in the dark about the law. Finally, employers can (and often do) remind their employees of
their noncompete—especially those with unenforceable noncompetes—to render them more likely
to (mistakenly) believe their noncompete is enforceable.
We also show that an information treatment, which roughly simulates an educational campaign,
can cause employees to update their beliefs—especially employees whose noncompetes are unenforceable. After receiving information, employees with unenforceable noncompetes report that their
noncompete would be less of a factor in their choice whether to accept employment with a competitor
than they indicate under mistaken beliefs of enforceability. However, employees as a group do not
fully adjust their mobility intentions (i.e., they do not report that their noncompete would no longer be
a factor whatsoever in leaving for a competitor). In fact, a nontrivial fraction of employees who see
their noncompetes as unenforceable and who view a lawsuit as unlikely continue to consider their
noncompete to be a factor in deciding whether to take a job offer at a competitor. This result suggests
that moral, reputational, and perhaps financial costs remain for violating even entirely unenforceable
contract provisions. We also show that stronger beliefs in enforceability cause employees to be more
concerned about their noncompete when considering an offer from a competitor, and we present
evidence that this effect may be due in part to perceptions that a lawsuit is more likely. At the same
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time, noncompete-bound employees appear no more likely to negotiate over the terms of their noncompete or for other benefits in exchange for agreeing not to compete when they believe their noncompete is enforceable.
Our study has several limitations. First, because we cannot follow employees over time, we can
only estimate very short-term elasticities. We hope future work will address this shortcoming by collecting and analyzing the long-term outcomes of similar information experiments. Second, our experiment is convoluted in its design and specific to the context of a survey. To the extent that the medium
and the specifics of the language itself were responsible for our findings (or lack thereof), our results
may not extend to other types of educational campaigns (Armantier et al. 2016, Hertwig et al. 2014).
Third, our study is one about employee beliefs. We know little about what employers know about the
law and how their beliefs matter (or do not) for their choices. Finally, while we took great pains to
clean and weight our data appropriately, our analysis nevertheless builds on a selected sample. Future
work should examine these issues using alternative samples.
Our empirical results contribute to the important and growing literature on postemployment restrictive covenants. This body of work relies mostly on the legal enforceability of noncompetes, exploiting bans or other smaller changes in noncompete laws at the state level (Marx et al. 2009, Garmaise 2009, Balasubramanian et al. 2022, Lipsitz and Starr 2022, Johnson et al. 2020, Jeffers 2020).
One goal of this article is to emphasize that researchers pay too little attention to the impact of unenforceable noncompetes and the role of individual beliefs about the law (Starr et al. 2020). Our work
stresses—with respect to noncompete research as well as all research examining state policy shocks
without accounting for underlying beliefs—that voiding contracts in court ex post may have little
practical effect if employees continue to believe that anything that appears in a contract must be enforceable (Chetty 2015). As a result, studies examining bans on noncompetes (Balasubramanian et al.
2022, Marx et al. 2009, Marx et al. 2015, Lipsitz and Starr 2022) that assume such bans end the use of
noncompetes may understate the effect of noncompetes since (a) employers may still use noncompetes and (b) employees may still view these noncompetes as enforceable.
As a result, policymakers and antitrust agencies (Posner 2020) concerned about the potential ill
effects of (unenforceable) noncompetes may need to consider reforms that induce employers to reduce the use of noncompetes in the first place as opposed to policies that limit their enforceability in
court or simply inform employees that they are unenforceable (since at least some employees seem
likely to continue to adhere to them). Two natural options include statutory penalties for inappropriate
noncompete use or requiring employers to pay former employees during the prohibition period
(known as garden leave). Oregon, for example, adopted garden leave in 2008 (see Lipsitz and Starr
2022) and Virginia’s recent noncompete law (Va. Code Ann. § 40.1-28.7:8) requires employers to pay
$10,000 for each illegal noncompete. Both of these policies are not without their challenges, however—employers may skirt paying garden leave, and it may be difficult to identify employers using
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unenforceable noncompetes. A third approach, recently highlighted in California, is for state bars to
view using unenforceable contractual clauses as unethical, which may encourage lawyers to actively
eliminate such restrictions (Gerstein and Shearer 2019). The effectiveness of each of these approaches
in deterring the use of unenforceable provisions is an important avenue for future research.
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Tables

States

Sample

Table 1. Summary Statistics By Actual Enforceability
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
No Enforceability
Medium Enforceability

Arizona (Physicians), California,
Colorado (Non-Professionals,
Physicians), Delaware (Physicians),
Illinois (Physicians), Massachusetts
(Physicians), Tennessee (Physicians), North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Texas (Physicians)

Full Sample

(5)
(6)
High Enforceability

Alabama, Alaska, Colorado (ProArizona, Arkansas, Indiana, Louisifessionals), Connecticut, Delaware,
ana, Maryland, Minnesota, MonFlorida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iltana, Nebraska, New Mexico,
linois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
North Carolina, Oregon, PennsylMaine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
vania, Rhode Island, South CaroMississippi, Missouri, Nevada,
lina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, VirNew Hampshire, New Jersey, New
ginia, West Virginia, Washington,
York, Ohio, South Dakota, TenWisconsin, Wyoming
nessee

Noncompete
Sample

Full Sample

Observations
Age
Hours Worked Per Week
Weeks Worked Per Year
𝟙𝟙(Male)
𝟙𝟙(Multi-Unit Employer)
𝟙𝟙(Employer > 1K Employees)
𝟙𝟙(Highest Degree is ≥ BA)
Pre-Experiment P(Enforce)

1,484
205
4,376
40.51
42.43
40.11
39.25
42.44
37.24
48.79
49.84
47.90
0.56
0.72
0.52
0.64
0.78
0.64
0.39
0.49
0.38
0.44
0.68
0.27
0.43
0.46
0.42
Note. We present sample means for each sample, cut by actual noncompete enforceability.

Noncompete
Sample

Full Sample

Noncompete
Sample

685
39.33
40.61
47.46
0.55
0.77
0.45
0.47
0.40

5,645
40.48
37.34
47.41
0.52
0.62
0.37
0.30
0.43

857
40.45
41.50
48.65
0.56
0.67
0.40
0.52
0.44
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Table 2. Beliefs about the Locus of Noncompete Enforcement Policy
Agreed to
Overall
Education Level
Noncompete?
<BA BA >BA
Yes
No
Maybe
Don’t know
0.44
0.48 0.39
0.32
0.33
0.45
0.52
Citywide
0.05
0.05 0.05
0.07
0.05
0.05
0.06
Countywide
0.05
0.04 0.05
0.07
0.06
0.04
0.04
Nationally
0.23
0.22 0.24
0.23
0.26
0.23
0.19
Statewide
0.24
0.21 0.27
0.32
0.30
0.23
0.19
Unweighted
9,460
4,116 3,717 1,627
1,747 6,344 1,369
Observations
Note. Survey Question: “Non-competition policy is determined at what level?” The
table displays percentages that sum to 100% within each column. Education level refers to employee’s highest educational degree (BA = bachelor’s degree).

Table 3. Beliefs about Noncompete Enforceability in Employee’s State
Panel A. “Are noncompetes enforceable in your state?”
Agreed to
Education Levels
Noncompete?
Overall
<BA
BA
>BA
Yes
No
Maybe
Don’t know
0.37
0.38
0.33
0.34
0.21
0.36
0.54
No
0.05
0.05
0.04
0.07
0.04
0.04
0.09
Yes
0.59
0.57
0.63
0.60
0.76
0.61
0.37
Panel B. Accuracy of Beliefs
Overall
0.37
0.11
0.53

Education Levels
<BA
BA
>BA
0.38
0.33
0.34
0.10
0.13
0.15
0.52
0.54
0.52

Agreed to
Noncompete?
Yes
No
Maybe
0.21
0.36
0.54
0.13
0.10
0.12
0.67
0.54
0.34

Uninformed
Misinformed
Informed
Unweighted
9,460
4,116 3,717 1,627
1,747 6,344 1,369
Observations
Note. The table displays percentages that sum to 100% within each column. Education
level refers to employee’s highest educational degree. Uninformed includes those respondents who do not know, while misinformed includes those who select the wrong
policy. We consider California, Oklahoma, and North Dakota to be states that do not
enforce noncompetes. All others enforce them (to some degree).
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Panel A: Full Sample of Individuals
with a Noncompete

Age
Hours Worked Per Week
Weeks Worked Per Year
𝟙𝟙(Male)
𝟙𝟙(Multi-Unit Employer)
𝟙𝟙(Employer > 1K Employees)
𝟙𝟙(Highest Degree is BA)
Pre-Experiment P(Enforce)

(1)

Table 4. Balance Test
(2)
(3)
(4)

No Info

Info

p-value

41.87
42.16
48.63
0.53
0.74
0.46
0.68
0.44

41.47
42.59
48.91
0.58
0.72
0.43
0.67
0.43

0.51
0.38
0.33
0.05
0.21
0.32
0.90
0.55

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

Panel B: Cut by Actual Enforceability
No Enforceability
Medium Enforceability
High Enforceability
No Info Info p-value
No Info Info p-value
No Info Info p-value
Age
41.85 41.10
0.67
41.50 41.14
0.70
42.17 41.83
0.69
Hours Worked Per Week
41.58 41.67
0.96
42.64 42.35
0.71
41.90 43.02
0.12
Weeks Worked Per Year
48.21 49.42
0.18
48.65 48.79
0.76
48.71 48.88
0.69
𝟙𝟙(Male)
0.58 0.59
0.94
0.49 0.56
0.07
0.55 0.58
0.31
𝟙𝟙(Multi-Unit Employer)
0.76 0.77
0.82
0.77 0.74
0.34
0.72 0.69
0.31
𝟙𝟙(Employer > 1K Employees)
0.43 0.45
0.79
0.49 0.46
0.36
0.43 0.41
0.48
𝟙𝟙(Highest Degree is ≥ BA)
0.73 0.74
0.85
0.65 0.64
0.66
0.68 0.69
0.95
Pre-Experiment P(Enforce)
0.40 0.44
0.47
0.42 0.40
0.64
0.48 0.46
0.41
Note. Our sample is limited to 1,747 individuals who have a noncompete. The p-value column reports the results of a test of the
null hypothesis of no mean difference between the information and no-information groups. We construct these unweighted comparisons using Stata’s “orth_out” command.
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Table 5. Instrumenting for Post-Experiment Enforceability Beliefs
(1)
(2)
(3)
Model: 2SLS

Instrumented P(Enforce)

𝟙𝟙(Current
Noncompete
Limits Future
Job Options)

𝟙𝟙(Noncompete
Is a Factor in
Joining
Competitor)

𝟙𝟙(Noncompete
Is a Factor in
Starting
Competitor)

0.434**
(0.163)

0.659**
(0.127)

0.577**
(0.121)

(4)

(5)

𝟙𝟙(Employee Would Negotiate
Over Noncompete)

-0.121
(0.136)

0.286**
(0.081)

No
Sample
Noncompete
Noncompete
Noncompete
Noncompete
Noncompete
Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Pre-Experiment Dependent Variable
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Observations
1,747
1,747
1,747
1,709
9,758
F-Stat
54.29
51.49
50.25
51.64
51.86
Mean of Dependent Variable
0.233
0.415
0.523
0.603
0.744
Note. We report robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level. Our sample for columns (1)–(4) is limited to
individuals with a noncompete, while column (5) focuses on those without a noncompete. All models except for column (5)
include main effects of the pre-experiment measure of the particular dependent variable, which we measure a second time after
the experiment (both for those who do and do not receive enforceability information). The instrument for post-experiment beliefs is a three-way interaction of an indicator for pre-experiment beliefs about enforceability being greater than 50%, indicators
for living in a no, medium, or high enforceability state, and whether the individual randomly receives information. Controls include pre-experiment beliefs about enforceability, indicators for enforceability (no, medium, high) interacted with an indicator
for pre-experiment enforceability beliefs being greater than 50% (as in the instrument), and other demographics we describe in
text. The F-Stat reports the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic, which tests for weak instruments with clustered standard errors.
** p < .01.
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Table 6. The Mediating Effect of the Likelihood of Lawsuit
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
P(Employer Would
Sue Over Noncom𝟙𝟙(Noncompete Is a Factor in Joining Competitor)
pete if Violated)
Post-Experiment P(Enforce)
Post-Experiment P(Lawsuit)
𝟙𝟙(Information)

𝟙𝟙(Medium Enforceability)
𝟙𝟙(High Enforceability)

𝟙𝟙(Medium Enforceability) ×
𝟙𝟙(Information)
𝟙𝟙(High Enforceability) ×
𝟙𝟙(Information)

0.411**
(0.087)
-0.252**
(0.064)
-0.050
(0.079)
-0.083
(0.065)
0.164*

0.570**
(0.056)
-0.150*
(0.056)
-0.051
(0.071)
-0.105+
(0.057)
0.071

(0.077)
0.256**

(0.072)
0.171*

(0.081)

(0.073)

0.578**
(0.036)

0.390**
(0.051)
0.287**
(0.071)

0.659**
(0.127)

(7)

0.443*
(0.191)
-0.363
(0.389)

Model
2SLS
OLS
OLS
OLS
OLS
2SLS
2SLS
Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
1,747
1,747
1,747
1,747
1,747
1,747
1,747
F-Stat
42.67
51.49
Mean of Dependent Variable
0.389
0.415
0.415
0.415
0.415
0.415
0.415
% of Main Effect Driven by P(Lawsuit)
40.5
32.5
32.8
Note. We report robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level. Our sample is limited to individuals with a noncompete. The instrument for postexperiment beliefs is a three-way interaction of an indicator for pre-experiment beliefs about enforceability being greater than 50%, an indicator for living in a no, medium, or high enforceability state, and whether the individual randomly receives information. Controls include pre-experiment beliefs about enforceability, indicators for
enforceability (no, medium, high) interacted with an indicator for pre-experiment enforceability beliefs greater than 50% (as in the instrument), and other demographics
we describe in text. The F-Stat reports the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic, which tests for weak instruments with clustered standard errors. For column (7), we apply
the IV Mediation analysis recommended by Dippel et al. (2020).
+p < .10.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
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Figures

Figure 1. Accuracy of noncompete enforceability beliefs by actual enforceability

Figure 2. Accuracy of noncompete enforceability beliefs
by actual enforceability and education
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Figure 3. Categorical and continuous beliefs about noncompete enforceability

Figure 4. Noncompete enforceability beliefs by actual enforceability
and noncompete status
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Figure 5. Noncompete enforceability beliefs held by individuals with a noncompete
by actual enforceability and education

Figure 6. Search effort toward competitors and noncompete
enforceability beliefs

39
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/231
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3873638

40

Prescott and Starr:

Figure 7. Noncompete enforceability beliefs by actual enforceability
and competitor-offer receipt

Figure 8. Probability employer reminded employee about noncompete
by actual enforceability
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Figure 9. Reminders and beliefs about noncompete enforceability

Figure 10. Distribution of noncompete enforceability beliefs before and after experiment
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Figure 11. Average post-experiment beliefs by actual enforceability and treatment status

Figure 12. Relationship between pre-experiment and post-experiment beliefs
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Figure 13. Heterogeneity in post-experiment beliefs and pre-experiment beliefs
among employees with a noncompete

Figure 14. Noncompete as a factor in leaving by noncompete
enforceability and treatment status
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Figure 15. Post-experiment heterogeneity in noncompete as a factor
in leaving by pre-experiment answer

Figure 16. Negotiation over noncompetes and noncompete enforceability
among employees with a noncompete
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Figure 17. Noncompete as a factor in leaving by beliefs about enforceability
and likelihood of lawsuit
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Online Appendix A. Additional Figures and Tables
Score
1

0.5

0

Table OA1. Noncompete Policies by State
Panel A. Handling of Overbroad Covenants

Rewrite unreasonably overbroad noncompete terms to make the terms reasonable and enforce the revised noncompete against the employee

Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, DC, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming

Remove unreasonably overbroad terms
from a noncompete contract but enforce
the rest of the provision

Arizona, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Montana, North Carolina, Rhode Island

Refuse to enforce a noncompete against
an employee if any part of the contractual
provision is unreasonably overbroad

Arkansas, Nebraska, South Carolina, Virginia, Wisconsin

1

Enforce a noncompete against an employee even when the employee is terminated from their job without cause

0

Refuse to enforce a noncompetes against
an employee unless the employee voluntarily leaves their job or is terminated
without cause

1

Enforce a noncompete against an employee even if the employee only received
continued employment in exchange for
agreeing to the noncompete

0

Refuse to enforce a noncompete against
an employee unless the employee is given
additional consideration (such as additional compensation, training, or other

Panel B. Enforce if Employee is Terminated Without Cause?
Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wyoming
DC, Maryland, Montana
Panel C. Enforcement Dependent on Consideration?
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, DC, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont
Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Washington,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming
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benefits) beyond continued employment in
exchange for agreeing to the noncompete
0

1

0

0

0

Refuse to enforce a noncompete against
an employee if the employer did not notify the employee at least 14 days before
the start of employment that the employer would request the noncompete

Oregon
Panel D. Exemptions

Enforce a noncompete against an employee only if the employee is an executive or management-level employee or
related professional staff
Refuse to enforce (or be very unlikely to
enforce) a noncompete against an employee who is a physician

Colorado

Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts, Tennessee, Texas

Refuse to enforce a noncompete against
an employee who leaves to join or start a
competing business, regardless of the circumstances

California, North Dakota

Refuse to enforce a noncompete against
an employee who leaves to join or start a
competing business but restrict the ability
of the employee to directly solicit clients
from their former employer

Oklahoma

Note. We report the actual language we use in the experimental treatment in Figure OA6. We derive this classification from Beck (2014). See Online Appendix C for more details. The overall measure of enforceability adds each score for each state and adds an additional one (1) point for states that enforce
noncompetes under any circumstances. As a result, the maximum score a state can receive is four (4). We normalize this measure by dividing by the maximum score for each state, such that nonenforcing states (or nonenforcing state-occupation combinations) receive a score of zero (0) and states that robustly enforce noncompetes receive a score of one (1).
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Table OA2. Enforceability Beliefs by Categorical Beliefs, Noncompete Status, and Education
Dependent Variable:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Probability Noncompete Enforced
Categorical Beliefs
Noncompete Status
Education
Constant
𝟙𝟙(Don’t Know if Noncompete Enforceable)
𝟙𝟙(Believe Noncompete Is Enforceable)
𝟙𝟙(Medium Enforceability)

0.207**
(0.042)
0.065
(0.043)
0.274**
(0.048)

0.682
(0.592)
0.082*
(0.033)
0.296**
(0.032)

𝟙𝟙(High Enforceability)
𝟙𝟙(No Noncompete)

𝟙𝟙(Maybe Noncompete)

𝟙𝟙(Medium Enforceability) × 𝟙𝟙(No Noncompete)

𝟙𝟙(Medium Enforceability) × 𝟙𝟙(Maybe Noncompete)
𝟙𝟙(High Enforceability) × 𝟙𝟙(No Noncompete)

𝟙𝟙(High Enforceability) × 𝟙𝟙(Maybe Noncompete)

-0.019
(0.025)
-0.010
(0.029)

𝟙𝟙(Bachelor’s Degree)

𝟙𝟙(Above Bachelor’s Degree)

𝟙𝟙(Medium Enforceability) × 𝟙𝟙(Bachelor’s)

0.462**
(0.011)

0.456*
(0.201)

0.491**
(0.026)

0.792
(0.569)

-0.059**
(0.020)
-0.021
(0.027)
0.009
(0.018)
-0.099**
(0.014)
0.062*
(0.030)
0.058+
(0.031)
0.039
(0.031)
0.018
(0.031)

-0.079**
(0.023)
-0.038
(0.029)
0.008
(0.021)
-0.107**
(0.019)
0.074*
(0.029)
0.070*
(0.028)
0.048
(0.030)
0.028
(0.030)
-0.028**
(0.010)
-0.067**
(0.013)

-0.073
(0.052)
-0.060
(0.042)

-0.077
(0.047)
-0.057
(0.046)

-0.041
(0.049)
-0.045
(0.049)
0.003
(0.069)
0.024
(0.100)
0.068
(0.065)
0.045
(0.074)

-0.035
(0.053)
-0.045
(0.046)
-0.026
(0.062)
-0.005
(0.084)
0.034
(0.056)
0.010
(0.069)

𝟙𝟙(Medium Enforceability) × 𝟙𝟙(Above Bachelor’s)
𝟙𝟙(High Enforceability) × 𝟙𝟙(Bachelor’s)

𝟙𝟙(High Enforceability) × 𝟙𝟙(Above Bachelor’s)

Controls
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Observations
1,747
1,747
11,505
11,505
1,747
1,747
Mean R-Squared
0.066
0.155
0.022
0.048
0.006
0.0967
Note. We report standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level, using least squares estimation. Our sample is
limited to individuals with a noncompete for columns (1), (2), (5), and (6). Basic controls include employee gender, em-

ployee education, employee race, a third-degree polynomial in employee age, the class of the employer (e.g., forprofit), the type of occupation (2-digit SOC), industry (2-digit NAICS), employee class (e.g., hourly vs. salary), hours
worked per week, weeks worked per year, the interaction of hours and weeks worked, employer size, whether the
employer has multiple establishments, and the log of number of establishments in the employee’s county-industry.
Mean R-Squared is the mean of R-Squared statistics generated by our multiple-imputation analysis as we explain in
Online Appendix B.
+p

< .10.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
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Model: OLS

Table OA3. Search Effort and the Receipt of Job Offers from Competitors
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Search Effort Toward
P(Enforce)
Competitor

Constant
𝟙𝟙(Medium Enforceability)
𝟙𝟙(High Enforceability)
𝟙𝟙(Information)

𝟙𝟙(Medium Enforceability) × 𝟙𝟙(Information)
𝟙𝟙(High Enforceability) × 𝟙𝟙(Information)
𝟙𝟙(Received Competitor Offer)

2.759**
(0.131)
-0.324
-0.307
-0.276
(0.343)
1.535**
(0.350)
-1.651**
(0.486)
-1.359**
(0.466)

𝟙𝟙(Medium Enforceability) × 𝟙𝟙(Competitor Offer)
𝟙𝟙(High Enforceability) × 𝟙𝟙(Competitor Offer)

-0.442
(3.988)
0.343
(0.253)
0.055
(0.352)
1.265*
(0.476)
-1.696**
(0.486)
-1.195*
(0.589)

0.459**
(0.011)
-0.079**
(0.018)
-0.022
(0.024)

0.766
(0.548)
-0.090**
(0.024)
-0.031
(0.030)

0.018
(0.067)
0.113
(0.082)
0.010
(0.091)

0.084
(0.062)
0.030
(0.084)
-0.054
(0.086)

Controls
No
Yes
No
Yes
Observations
1,747
1,747
1,747
1,747
Mean R-Squared
0.014
0.178
0.012
0.102
Mean of Dependent Variable
2.573
2.573
0.428
0.428
Note. We report robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level. Our sample is limited to
individuals with a noncompete. Basic controls include employee gender, employee education, employee
race, a third-degree polynomial in employee age, the class of the employer (e.g., for-profit), the type of occupation (2-digit SOC), industry (2-digit NAICS), employee class (e.g., hourly vs. salary), hours worked per
week, weeks worked per year, the interaction of hours and weeks worked, employer size, whether the employer has multiple establishments, and the log of number of establishments in the employee’s county-industry. Mean R-Squared is the mean of R-Squared statistics generated by our multiple-imputation

analysis as we explain in Online Appendix B.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
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Model: OLS
Constant
𝟙𝟙(Medium Enforceability)
𝟙𝟙(High Enforceability)

𝟙𝟙(Employer Reminded about Noncompete)

Table OA4. Reminders and Lawsuits
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
P(Enforce)
𝟙𝟙(Employer Reminded
Employee about
Noncompete)
0.591**
(0.067)
-0.239*
(0.093)
-0.242*
(0.092)

3.683**
(1.248)
-0.398**
(0.113)
-0.377**
(0.088)

𝟙𝟙(Medium Enforceability) × 𝟙𝟙(Noncompete Reminder)

𝟙𝟙(High Enforceability) × 𝟙𝟙(Noncompete Reminder)
𝟙𝟙(Employee Aware of Other Suits)

0.383**
(0.078)
0.048
(0.094)
0.010
(0.123)
0.331**
(0.088)
-0.074

2.077
(1.400)
-0.224*
(0.084)
-0.180*
(0.087)
0.140
(0.098)
0.248*

(0.123)
-0.052
(0.196)

(0.115)
0.169
(0.130)

(5)
(6)
𝟙𝟙(Employee Aware of
Employer Suing Others Over Noncompete)
0.208**
(0.031)
0.022
(0.040)
-0.003
(0.034)

𝟙𝟙(Medium Enforceability) ×
𝟙𝟙(Employee Aware of Other Suits)
𝟙𝟙(High Enforceability) ×
𝟙𝟙(Employee Aware of Other Suits)

-0.670
(0.471)
0.042
(0.042)
0.005
(0.042)

(7)
(8)
P(Enforce)

0.415**
(0.008)
-0.043
(0.029)
-0.010
(0.019)

0.874
(0.557)
-0.063*
(0.029)
-0.018
(0.027)

0.224**
(0.045)
-0.092

0.280**
(0.041)
-0.142*

(0.080)
-0.050

(0.060)
-0.119

(0.086)

(0.094)

Controls
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Observations
237
237
237
237
1,747
1,747
1,747
1,747
Mean R-Squared
0.034
0.522
0.151
0.601
0.001
0.141
0.038
0.129
Mean of Dependent Variable
0.392
0.392
0.519
0.519
0.216
0.216
0.428
0.428
Note. We report robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level. Our sample is limited to individuals with a noncompete. Our sample for
columns (1)–(4) is limited to individuals with a noncompete who received job offers from competitors. Basic controls include employee gender, employee education, employee race, a third-degree polynomial in employee age, the class of the employer (e.g., for-profit), the type of occupation (2-digit SOC), industry (2digit NAICS), employee class (e.g., hourly vs. salary), hours worked per week, weeks worked per year, the interaction of hours and weeks worked, employer size,
whether the employer has multiple establishments, and the log of number of establishments in the employee’s county-industry. Mean R-Squared is the mean

of R-Squared statistics generated by our multiple-imputation analysis as we explain in Online Appendix B.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
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Table OA5. Information Experiment and Post-Experiment Beliefs About Enforceability
(1)
Model: OLS

(2)

(3)

(4)

Post-Experiment Beliefs P(Enforce)

Constant

0.418**
(0.040)

0.619
(0.384)

0.101**
(0.018)

-0.015
(0.307)

𝟙𝟙(Medium Enforceability)

0.026
(0.047)

-0.011
(0.047)

0.051
(0.040)

0.028
(0.051)

0.045
(0.049)

0.004
(0.053)

0.076+
(0.039)

0.058+
(0.031)

𝟙𝟙(Information)

-0.215**
(0.032)

-0.216**
(0.034)

0.068*
(0.026)

0.082*
(0.038)

0.202**
(0.037)

0.177**
(0.039)

0.041
(0.075)

0.020
(0.084)

𝟙𝟙(High Enforceability) × 𝟙𝟙(Information)

0.214**
(0.045)

0.219**
(0.051)

0.022
(0.070)

-0.002
(0.058)

𝟙𝟙(P(Enforce)≥50%)

0.665**
(0.032)

0.691**
(0.044)

𝟙𝟙(P(Enforce)≥50%) × 𝟙𝟙(Medium Enforceability)

-0.109+
(0.055)

-0.132+
(0.076)

𝟙𝟙(P(Enforce)≥50%) × 𝟙𝟙(High Enforceability)

-0.142*
(0.059)

-0.169**
(0.063)

𝟙𝟙(P(Enforce)≥50%) × 𝟙𝟙(Information)

-0.604**
(0.046)

-0.632**
(0.066)

0.380**
(0.109)

0.422**
(0.126)

0.437**
(0.096)

0.471**
(0.089)

𝟙𝟙(High Enforceability)

𝟙𝟙(Medium Enforceability) × 𝟙𝟙(Information)

𝟙𝟙(P(Enforce)≥50%) × 𝟙𝟙(Medium Enforceability) ×
𝟙𝟙(Information)
𝟙𝟙(P(Enforce)≥50%) × 𝟙𝟙(High Enforceability) ×
𝟙𝟙(Information)
Controls

No

Yes

No

Yes

Observations

1,747

1,747

1,747

1,747

Mean R-Squared

0.039

0.122

0.400

0.460

Mean of Dependent Variable
0.425
0.425
0.425
0.425
Note. We report robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level. Our sample is limited to individuals with
a noncompete. The independent variable 𝟙𝟙(P(Enforce)≥50%) is the pre-experiment measure. Basic controls include employee gender, employee education, employee race, a third-degree polynomial in employee age, the class of the employer
(e.g., for-profit), the type of occupation (2-digit SOC), industry (2-digit NAICS), employee class (e.g., hourly vs. salary),
hours worked per week, weeks worked per year, the interaction of hours and weeks worked, employer size, whether the
employer has multiple establishments, and the log of number of establishments in the employee’s county-industry. Mean RSquared is the mean of R-Squared statistics generated by our multiple-imputation analysis as we explain in Online Appendix B.
+p < .10.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
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Table OA6. Information Experiment and Noncompetes as a Factor in Moving to Competitor
(1)
Model: OLS

(2)

(3)

(4)

Post-Experiment 𝟙𝟙(Noncompete Factor in Moving)

Constant

0.467**
(0.054)

2.721**
(0.665)

0.194+
(0.106)

1.871**
(0.560)

𝟙𝟙(Medium Enforceability)

-0.015
(0.087)

-0.050
(0.079)

-0.089
(0.124)

-0.107
(0.093)

-0.015
(0.066)

-0.083
(0.065)

-0.057
(0.112)

-0.116
(0.092)

𝟙𝟙(Information)

-0.251**
(0.046)

-0.252**
(0.064)

-0.105
(0.104)

-0.126
(0.103)

0.205*
(0.098)

0.164*
(0.077)

0.170
(0.121)

0.121
(0.109)

𝟙𝟙(High Enforceability) × 𝟙𝟙(Information)

0.224**
(0.063)

0.256**
(0.081)

0.130
(0.130)

0.144
(0.124)

0.629**
(0.089)

0.627**
(0.071)

0.081
(0.104)

0.054
(0.086)

0.004
(0.117)

-0.011
(0.108)

-0.304**
(0.104)

-0.230**
(0.080)

0.116
(0.117)

0.115
(0.088)

0.229

0.204

(0.160)

(0.138)

𝟙𝟙(High Enforceability)

𝟙𝟙(Medium Enforceability) × 𝟙𝟙(Information)
𝟙𝟙(Noncompete Factor in Moving)

𝟙𝟙(Noncompete Factor in Moving) ×
𝟙𝟙(Medium Enforceability)
𝟙𝟙(Noncompete Factor in Moving) ×
𝟙𝟙(High Enforceability)
𝟙𝟙(Noncompete Factor in Moving) ×
𝟙𝟙(Information)

𝟙𝟙(Noncompete Factor in Moving) ×
𝟙𝟙(Medium Enforceability) × 𝟙𝟙(Information)
𝟙𝟙(Noncompete Factor in Moving) ×
𝟙𝟙(High Enforceability) × 𝟙𝟙(Information)
Controls

No

Yes

No

Yes

Observations

1,747

1,747

1,747

1,747

Mean R-Squared

0.019

0.150

0.372

0.464

Mean of Dependent Variable
0.415
0.415
0.415
0.415
Note. We report robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level. Our sample is limited to individuals
with a noncompete. The independent variable 𝟙𝟙(Noncompete Factor in Moving) is the pre-experiment measure. Basic
controls include employee gender, employee education, employee race, a third-degree polynomial in employee age, the
class of the employer (e.g., for-profit), the type of occupation (2-digit SOC), industry (2-digit NAICS), employee class
(e.g., hourly vs. salary), hours worked per week, weeks worked per year, the interaction of hours and weeks worked, employer size, whether the employer has multiple establishments, and the log of number of establishments in the employee’s
county-industry. Mean R-Squared is the mean of R-Squared statistics generated by our multiple-imputation analysis as we
explain in Online Appendix B.
+p < .10.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
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Table OA7. Beliefs about Enforceability and the Importance of a Noncompete
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)

(6)

“Suppose that at your current job you receive an offer to perform your same duties in a comparable, competing company. How important are the following factors in determining whether or not you decide to move to the comparable, competing company? (7 Extremely important to 1 Not at all important)”
Column (4)–(6) Dependent Variable: Importance of _____ minus Importance of the
“fact that I signed a CNC”
Model: 2SLS

Instrumented P(Enforce)

Importance of
“The fact that I
signed and
agreed to the
CNC”
2.100**
(0.629)

Importance of
“The chance my Importance of
employer would “The chance the
take legal action court will enforce
to try to enforce my noncompete”
my CNC”
1.751**
(0.419)

2.925**
(0.557)

“The increase
in prestige,
training, or opportunity to do
more exciting
work”

“The increase in
my compensation or other
benefits"

"The location
of the new job
and other lifestyle benefits"

-1.344**
(0.340)

-2.023**
(0.457)

-2.591**
(0.725)

Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Pre-Experiment Dependent Variable
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
1,747
1,747
1,747
1,747
1,747
1,747
F-Stat
50.30
46.48
46.34
55.03
53.50
51.86
Mean of Dependent Variable
4.448
4.525
4.543
1.038
1.566
1.277
Notes. We report robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level. Our sample is limited to individuals with a noncompete. All models include main effects of the pre-experiment measure of the particular dependent variable, which we measure a
second time after the experiment (both for those who do and do not receive enforceability information). The instrument for postexperiment beliefs is a three-way interaction of an indicator for pre-experiment beliefs about enforceability being greater than 50%,
indicators for living in a no, medium, or high enforceability state, and whether the individual randomly receives information. Controls
include pre-experiment beliefs about enforceability, indicators for enforceability (no, medium, high) interacted with an indicator for
pre-experiment enforceability beliefs being greater than 50% (as in the instrument), and other demographics we describe in text. The
F-Stat reports the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic, which tests for weak instruments with clustered standard errors.
** p < .01.
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Figure OA1. Noncompete enforceability in 2014 for contiguous United States

Figure OA2. Beliefs about noncompete enforceability in state by occupation
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Figure OA3. Awareness that employer has sued others to enforce a noncompete

Note. The figure shows how actual noncompete enforceability relates to the likelihood that an employee reports their
employer has legally pursued others for violating a noncompete. Our sample is limited to individuals with a noncompete.
We present results as predicted values (with 95% confidence intervals) from a model with basic controls (corresponding
to Table OA4 column (6)—see column (5) for an uncontrolled model), using sample weights.

Figure OA4. Awareness of other noncompete lawsuits and beliefs about enforceability

Note. The figure shows how employee beliefs about noncompete enforceability relate to the likelihood that an employee
reports their employer has legally pursued others for violating a noncompete, cut by actual enforceability. Our sample is
limited to individuals with a noncompete. We present results as predicted values (with 95% confidence intervals) from a
model with basic controls, an interaction between awareness of respondent’s employer suing another over a noncompete
and actual enforceability (corresponding to Table OA4 column (8)—see column (7) for an uncontrolled model), using
sample weights.
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Figure OA5. General noncompete enforceability information treatment
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Figure OA6. State-specific noncompete enforceability information treatment

Note. Blue arrows indicate that the survey will only display the bullet point if the respondent’s answers and demographics meet certain criteria. The survey shows the respondent only the bullet points that are relevant for a given
respondent-selected state using the classification in Beck (2014).
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Figure OA7. Heterogeneity in post-experiment beliefs and pre-experiment beliefs
among employees without noncompetes

Note. The figure shows how average post-experiment beliefs about noncompete enforceability differ between those who
receive enforceability information and those who do not receive information, cut by actual enforceability and by preexperiment beliefs (above or below 50%). Our sample is limited to individuals without a noncompete. We present results
as predicted values (with 95% confidence intervals) from a model with basic controls, a three-way interaction (with all
the double interactions as well) between actual enforceability, an indicator for receiving information, and an indicator for
pre-experiment beliefs about enforceability being greater than 50%, using sample weights.

Figure OA8. Noncompete as a factor in starting a competitor
by actual enforceability and treatment status

Note. The figure shows how the post-experiment likelihood a noncompete would be a factor in starting a competitor
differs between those who receive enforceability information and those who do not receive information, cut by actual
enforceability. Our sample is limited to individuals with a noncompete. We present results as predicted values (with 95%
confidence intervals) from a model with basic controls and an interaction between receiving information and actual enforceability, using sample weights.
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Figure OA9. Heterogeneity in noncompete as a factor in starting a competitor
by pre-experiment answer

Note. The figure shows how the post-experiment likelihood a noncompete would be a factor in starting a competitor
differs between those who receive enforceability information and those who do not receive information, cut by actual
enforceability and by the respondent’s pre-experiment answer to the same question about whether their noncompete
would be a factor in starting a competitor. Our sample is limited to individuals with a noncompete. We present results as
predicted values (with 95% confidence intervals) from a model with basic controls, a three-way interaction (and all the
double interactions) between actual enforceability, receiving information, and a pre-experiment indicator for whether the
noncompete would be a factor in starting a competitor, using sample weights.

Figure OA10. Post-experiment negotiation over noncompetes by treatment status
among employees with a noncompete

Note. The figure shows how the post-experiment likelihood of negotiating over a prospective noncompete differs between those who receive enforceability information and those who do not receive information, cut by actual enforceability. Our sample is limited to respondents without noncompetes. We present results as predicted values (with 95% confidence intervals) from a model with basic controls, an interaction between getting information and actual enforceability,
using sample weights.
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Figure OA11. Post-experiment negotiation over noncompetes by treatment status
among employees without a noncompete

Notes. The figure shows how the post-experiment likelihood of negotiating over a prospective noncompete differs between those who receive enforceability information and those who do not receive information, cut by actual enforceability. Our sample is limited to individuals without noncompetes. We present result as predicted values (with 95% confidence intervals) from a model with basic controls and an interaction between receiving information and actual enforceability, using sample weights.

Figure OA12. Correlation between beliefs about the likelihood of enforceability and lawsuit

Notes. The figure shows the unconditional relationship between beliefs about the likelihood of enforceability and the
average beliefs about the likelihood that a respondent’s employer would legally pursue them if they violate the terms of
their noncompete, before the experiment (left panel), after the experiment (middle panel), and the within-individual difference before and after the experiment (right panel, cut by whether they receive information). The sample is limited to
individuals with a noncompete. We show 95% confidence intervals and use sample weights.
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Online Appendix B
OB. Data Appendix
This article’s data derive from a labor force (i.e., employee) survey that we designed and implemented between April and July 2014. Our goal in conducting the survey was to understand the use
and effects of covenants not to compete (“noncompetes”), both in a respondent’s current job and
over the course of a respondent’s career. In this appendix, we describe the survey’s origin, design,
and sampling frame as well as our cleaning and processing of the data to clarify important aspects of
this article’s analysis. We draw heavily on an earlier technical article that describes these issues in meticulous detail (Prescott et al. 2016) and those who are interested can find virtually identical content
in the appendices of Starr et al. (2020) and Starr et al. (2021).
OB1. Sampling Frame and Data Collection Methodology
The sampling frame for this study are U.S. labor force participants aged 18–75 years who are
working in the private sector (for profit or nonprofit), working for a public health system, 49 or unemployed and looking for work. We exclude individuals who report being self-employed, government employees, non-U.S. citizens, or out of the labor force. To collect the data, we considered a
few possible survey platforms and collection methods, including using RAND’s American Life Panel
(ALP), conducting a random-digit-dial survey, and adding questions to ongoing established surveys
like the NLSY or the PSID. Ultimately, we concluded that our work required a nationally representative sample that was larger than the ALP could provide. We also determined that, to obtain a complete picture of an employee’s noncompete experiences, we needed to collect too many different
pieces of new information to build on existing surveys. Instead, it made more sense to design and
draft a noncompete-specific survey ourselves so that we would be able to ask all of the potentially
relevant questions. In the end, we settled on using Qualtrics, a reputable online survey company with
access to more than 10 million verified panel respondents. 50
The target size for this data-collection project was 10,000 completed surveys. We were able to
control the characteristics of the final sample through the use of quotas, which are simply constraints on the numbers of respondents with particular characteristics or sets of characteristics. In
particular, we sought a final sample in which respondents were 50% male; 60% with at least a bachelor’s degree; 50% with earnings of at least $50,000 annually from their current, highest paying job;
and 30% over the age of 55 years. We chose these particular thresholds either to align the sample
with the corresponding sample moments for labor force participants in the 2012 American Community Survey (ACS) or to oversample certain populations of interest.

49 We initially considered focusing only on the private sector, but we recognized that public health systems (e.g.,
those associated with public universities) also use noncompetes extensively.
50 The difference between verified and unverified survey respondents is important. The use of unverified survey
respondents means that there is no external validation of any information the respondent provides (e.g., a Google or
Facebook survey), while verified survey respondents have had some information verified by the survey company. We
signed up with a number of these companies to see how they vetted individuals who agreed to respond to online surveys. A typical experience involves filling out an intake form and providing fairly detailed demographic information, including a contact number. A day or so after completing the intake form, the applicant receives a phone call from the survey company at the number the applicant provided. On the call, the applicant is asked a series of questions related to the
information previously provided on the intake form. Verified respondents are those who are reachable at the phone
number supplied and who corroborate the information initially supplied.
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Respondents who completed the survey were compensated differently depending on the panel
provider: some were paid $1.50 and entered into prize sweepstakes; others were given tokens or
points in online games that they were playing. Respondents took a median time of approximately 28
minutes to complete the survey. Due to the length of the survey, we used three “attention filters”
spaced evenly throughout the survey to ensure that respondents were paying attention to the questions. Before we describe the cleaning process for our survey data, we briefly outline the costs and
benefits of using online surveys. 51
OB2. Costs and Benefits of Online Surveys
Online surveys come with a variety of benefits. Relative to random-digit-dial or in-person surveys, the cost per respondent is orders of magnitude lower and the data-collection time is orders of
magnitude faster. The interactive survey interface also allows the survey designer to write complicated, nested questions that are easy for respondents to answer through an online platform. Online
surveys also allow individuals to respond at their leisure via their preferred method (e.g., computer,
phone, tablet, etc.) from wherever they wish (e.g., work, home, or coffee shop). For these reasons,
Reuters, the well-known national polling company, has conducted all of its polling since 2012 online,
including its recent Presidential election polling. 52
However, these benefits come at a potentially high cost: a sample of online survey takers may
not be representative of the population of interest to researchers or policymakers. There are four
sample selection concerns in particular. First, not all people in the U.S. labor force are online. Second, not all of those online register to take surveys. Third, not all of those who register to take surveys receive any particular survey. Fourth, not all of those who are invited to take a survey finish it.
Among these sample selection concerns, only the second one is unique to online surveys. 53 With respect to the fourth, alternatives seem unlikely to be better. Kennedy and Hartig (2019) find that survey response to random-digit dialing fell to 6% in 2018, raising the very important question whether
a sample resulting from a random-digit-dial survey is still a random sample of the population. We
address each of these selection concerns in Prescott et al. (2016) and discuss the second concern in
particular in Section OB4.
OB3. Survey Cleaning
Qualtrics fielded the survey and obtained 14,668 completed surveys. When we began to review
this initial set of responses, we recognized that individuals with the same IP address may have taken
the survey multiple times given there were incentives. To address this, we retained only the first attempt to take the survey from a given IP address and only if that attempt resulted in a completed
survey, which produced a sample of 12,369 respondents. We next detected, by inspecting the raw
data by hand, that some individuals appeared to have the exact same responses, even for write-in
questions, despite the fact that the IP addresses recorded in the survey data were different. To weed
these out, we compared individual responses for those with the same gender, age, and race, living in
the same state and zip code, and working in the same county. We found 665 possible repeat survey
takers; the majority of these respondents took the survey with two different panel partners. We reviewed these potential repeat survey takers by hand, and, among those identified as repeat takers
The information contained in the following sections can be found in Tables 1–18 in Prescott et al. (2016).
See the methodology discussion linked at http://polling.reuters.com/.
53 For example, random-digit-dial surveys miss those without a phone, those who have a phone but do not receive
the survey call, and those who receive the call but decline to take the survey.
51
52
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from different IP addresses, we kept the first observation and dropped all others, leaving us with a
sample of 12,090 respondents. 54
In the next round of cleaning, we examined individual answers to identify any that were internally inconsistent or unreasonable in substance. In doing so, we developed a “flagging” algorithm
that flagged individuals for making mistakes within or across questions, in addition to manually reading through text entry answers. In analyzing these answers, we discovered that some individuals
were intentionally noncompliant (e.g., writing curse words or gibberish instead of their job title),
while others simply made idiosyncratic errors (e.g., noting that their entire employer was smaller
than their establishment—that is, their particular office or factory). We dropped respondents entirely
if we deemed them to be intentionally noncompliant because their singular responses indicated that
they did not take the survey seriously. This step left us with 11,529 survey responses. 55
In the last round of cleaning, we began with those who had clean surveys and those who had
made some sort of idiosyncratic error. From our flagging algorithm, we determined that 82.2% had
no flags and that 16.05% had just one flag (see Table 6 in Prescott et al. (2016)). The most common
flag was reporting earnings below the minimum wage (often 0), which was true for 1,007 of the
11,529 respondents. The challenge we faced was how to handle these flagged variables. We adopted
four approaches: the first was to do nothing—simply, retain all of offending values as they were.
The second was to drop all observations with any flag. The third was to replace offending values as
missing. The fourth was to impute or otherwise correct offending values. Our preferred method,
and the one we use in this article (although our findings are not very sensitive to this choice), is to
impute or correct these offending values. Specifically, we “repaired” entries that were marred by idiosyncratic inconsistency by replacing the less reliable, offending value with the value closest to the
originally submitted value that would not be inconsistent with the respondent’s other answers. When
an answer was clearly unreasonable or missing, and there was no workable single imputation procedure, we applied multiple imputation methods to calculate substitute values for the original missing
or unreasonable survey entries.
We also reviewed by hand the values of reported earnings, occupations, and industries, due to
their importance in our work. With regard to compensation, we manually reviewed all reported earnings greater than $200,000 per year and cross-checked them with the individual’s job title and duties
to ensure the amount seemed appropriate. We also examined potential typos in the number of zeros
(e.g., the sizable real-world difference between $20,000 and $200,000 may be missed on a screen by
survey respondents) by comparing reported annual earnings to expected annual earnings in subsequent years. If a typo was made by omitting a zero or by including an extra zero, we would expect to
see a ratio of 0.1 or 10. We imputed earnings that were unreasonable if we were unable to correct
the entry in a reliable way. With regard to occupation and industry, we had respondents self-select
two-digit NAICS and SOC codes within the survey and also report their job title, occupational duties, and employer’s line of business. To verify the two-digit NAICS and SOC codes—which are
crucial for both weighting and fixed effects in our empirical work—we had four sets of RAs independently code the 11,529 responses by taking job titles, occupational duties, and employer descriptions and matching them with the appropriate two-digit NAICS and SOC codes. 56 As part of this
process, we found that 24 individuals in the sample were self-employed, worked for the government,
or were retired, thus reducing our total number of respondents to 11,505.
See Tables 3–5 in Prescott et al. (2016) for more details.
See pp.412–14 in Prescott et al. (2016) for more details.
56 See p.422 of Prescott et al. (2016) for details.
54
55
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OB4. Sample Selection
As we observe above, there are four primary sample selection concerns with an online survey
like ours: (1) not everybody is online; (2) not everybody online signs up for online surveys; (3) not
everybody who signs up for online surveys receives a particular survey; and (4) not everybody who
receives a survey manages to complete it. We describe these issues in greater detail in Section II.E in
Prescott et al. (2016). All survey research must confront issues (1), (3) and (4)—the only unique selection concern for online surveys is (2). The key question is why individuals sign up to take online
surveys and whether that reason is associated with their noncompete status or experiences. 57 To understand why the individuals who responded to our survey agreed to take online surveys, we asked
them directly, and their responses were tabulated in Table 13 in Prescott et al. (2016). The two most
common reasons individuals report to explain their interest in taking online surveys are that they enjoy the rewards (59%) and sharing their opinions (58%). Only 40% indicated that they wanted
money, and only 23% claimed that they needed money. Taking these responses seriously, the crucial
selection question is, conditional on observables, whether individuals who like the available rewards
or sharing their opinions are less likely to be in jobs that require noncompetes. We believe it is certainly plausible that there is no such relationship.
A related sample selection concern is that individuals who participate in a survey may for some
reason lie or otherwise provide inaccurate information in a systematic way. We designed our cleaning strategy with the explicit goal of weeding out such individuals. However, in any surveying effort,
legitimate concerns remain about the validity of the responses of the individuals who remain in the
sample. To assuage these concerns, we present in Table OB1 the self-described job title, self-described job duties, and self-described industries for 15 randomly selected observations. These randomly selected respondents include a sales rep, a nurse, an analyst, a pizza delivery driver, an optometrist, and a programmer analyst. Reading their job-duty descriptions reveals a striking amount of detail, suggesting not only that these respondents answered the survey’s questions carefully but also
that they were responding truthfully.

57 A look at the population of online survey takers (see Table 12 of Prescott et al. (2016)) shows that relative to the
average labor force participant they tend to be female and less likely to be in full-time employment.
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Table OB1. Self-Described Job Title, Duties, and Industry for 15 Randomly Selected Respondents

Self-Described Job Title

Self-Described Job Duties

Self-Described Industry

1

Associate Analyst

My current job duties are to review and evaluate telephone recordings between our customers and customer contact representatives.

My current employer is a regional utilitiy company which
provides/sells electricity and natural gas to residential and
commercial customers.

2

project manager

Design and staff community health clinics, write proposals, seek Ensure children of low income families get preventive
funding, evaluate and educate
health and treatment if necessary

3

Quality Assurance Director

4

optometrist

5

purchasing clerk

6

sales rep

7

Sales Associate

8

Programmer analyst

9

Customer Service

10

Certified Medical Assistant

11

Analyst

12

Registered Nurse

I am responsible for providing dialysis services to current inpa- It is a rehabilitation hospital
tients

13

Title Coordinator

Process recorded deed of trust

14

LEGAL ASSISTANT

15

delivery driver

Review reports before going to our clients

Insurance Inspection Services

Care for patient's ocular health

Optometry

I have receptionist duties including purchasing office supplies
and filing the shipping department's paperwork.

retail art gallery

account manager for a sales base

sells office supplies and equipment

Sell phones and other communication devices, assist customers Retail sales company for cell phone business
and resolve issues.
Software developer

IT Consulting

I take phone calls from Customers.

My employer provides Health Insurance.

Assist the doctor in the office and minor office procedures while Healthcare provider
making sure the office runs efficiently.
researching our site's traffic

Publishing

Issue title policies

INTERACT W/STATE BOARD OF WORKERS'COMP,
PERSONAL INJURY/WORKERS' COMP ATTORPROVIDE PERSONAL INJURY REPRESENTATION, IN- NEY
VOLVES HIPAA LAWS
deliver food to people

pizza
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OB5. Weighting and Imputation
In this section, we describe our approach to 1) weighting our survey data and 2) imputing values
that are missing in our data or that we identified as problematic and marked as missing during the
data cleaning process. The fact that weights need to be incorporated into the imputation step to impute unbiased population values complicates these two tasks. In line with current survey methods,
we generated our analysis data by weighting our nonmissing data elements, imputing the missing
variables (including the weights in the imputation step), and then reweighting the data given the imputed values so that the resulting analysis data are nationally representative. Below, after discussing
our weighting approach, we explain how we combined weighting and multiple imputation methods
to assemble our data.
With respect to weighting, we considered and compared several candidate approaches, 58 including post-stratification, iterative proportional fitting (also called raking), and propensity score
weighting. Details on these methods can be found in Kalton et al. (2003). For each method, we evaluated a variety of potential weighting variables, and then we examined the ability of each weighting
scheme to match the distributions of variables within the 2014 American Community Survey (ACS)
(see Table 17 in Prescott et al. (2016)). Iterative proportional fitting, or raking, performed clearly better than alternatives in matching our data to the distributions of key variables in the ACS.
To assemble our analysis data, we began by using raking to calculate weights for our original
nonmissing survey data. Next, we imputed our missing data. Our goal was to impute values for
many different variables (see Table 18 in Prescott et al. (2016) for details), some of which were missing because of the cleaning process we describe above in Section A4 and others because we added
the relevant question to the survey while the survey was in the field. In addition, as we explain in the
article, we also aimed to impute whether the “maybe” individuals are currently or have ever been
bound by a noncompete. Because we sought to impute missing values across multiple variables, we
employed Stata’s chained multiple imputation command, which imputes missing values for all variables in one step. As suggested in Sterne et al. (2009), we incorporated all of the variables that we
planned to use in our empirical analyses into our imputation model. Doing otherwise would have
produced attenuated estimates. 59 Indeed, a general rule of thumb is that all variables involved in the
analysis should be included in the imputation model.
While imputing missing values just one time will allow for unbiased coefficient estimates, the associated standard error estimates will be too small because the predicted values will not convey the
uncertainty implicit in those estimates (King et al. 2001). To generate unbiased standard error estimates, Graham et al. (2007) recommend conducting at least 20 imputations when the proportion
missing is 30% (relevant for our “maybe” group). We added another 5 to increase power.
The exact mechanics for a given imputation step are as follows: First, we fit a regression model
with our initial nonmissing data. Second, we simulate new coefficients based on the posterior distribution of the estimated coefficients and standard errors—this step is what gives us variation across
the 25 datasets. Third, we combine these coefficients with the observed values of the covariates for
the missing observations to generate a predicted value. For continuous variables, we used predictive
mean matching in the third step. Specifically, we took the average of the 15 nearest neighbors to the
See pp.436–46 in Prescott et al. (2016) for more details.
Dependent variables should be included as controls in the imputation of an independent variable to avoid attenuation in the imputed estimates (Sterne et al. 2009). See also http://thestatsgeek.com/2015/05/07/including-the-outcome-in-imputation-models-of-covariates/.
58
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predicted value. For binary variables, we employed a logit model to create the predicted value. We
repeated this process 25 times for all missing values, creating 25 separate datasets.
Once we had 25 imputed datasets in hand, we reweighted within each dataset using the raking
procedure we discuss above, so that each individual dataset is nationally representative. In Table 2 of
Starr et al. (2021), we present a comparison of the distribution of demographics between the 2014
ACS and our weighted and unweighted data. The table shows that the weighted data quite accurately
match the distribution of contemporaneous ACS data and that the unweighted data indicate a much
more skilled workforce, one that does not align closely with the U.S. labor force. This occurs because we employed quotas to ensure that more than 50% of our sample was composed of respondents with a bachelor’s degree.
Estimation of our main analysis via multiple imputation involves running the regression model in
question on each individual dataset and then aggregating the 25 different estimates using Rubin’s
rules, combining the within-imputation variance and the between-imputation variance into our
standard error calculations. We note that standard regression statistics, like R-Squared, are not typically reported for regressions conducted with multiple-imputation data because there are 25 distinct
estimates of each statistic. To give a rough approximation of fit, we report the mean of our RSquared estimates.
Additional References
Graham, John W., Allison E. Olchowski, and Tamika D. Gilreath. 2007. How Many Imputations are
Really Needed? Some Practical Clarifications of Multiple Imputation Theory. Prevention Science
8:206–213.
Kalton, Graham, and Ismael Flores-Cervantes. 2003. Weighting Methods. Journal of Official Statistics
19(2):81–97.
Kennedy, Courtney, and Hannah Hartig. 2019. Response rates in telephone surveys have resumed
their decline. Pew Research Center. https://pewrsr.ch/2XqxgTTBan.
King, Gary, James Honaker, Anne Joseph, and Kenneth Scheve. 2001. Analyzing Incomplete Political Science Data: An Alternative Algorithm for Multiple Imputation. American Political Science Review 95(1):49–69.
Sterne, Jonathan A.C., Ian R. White, John B. Carlin, Michael Spratt, Patrick Royston, Michael G.
Kenward, Angela M. Wood, and James R. Carpenter. 2009. Multiple Imputation for Missing
Data in Epidemiological and Clinical Research: Potential and Pitfalls. British Medical Journal
338:b2393.
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Online Appendix C. State Policies According to Beck (2014)

State

AL

AK

AZ

Permitted

Protectable /
Legitimate
Interests

Yes. Ala. Code Sec. Trade Secrets; Cus8-1-1
tomer Relationships

Standards

Exemptions

Protectable Interest; Restriction is
Reasonably Related to the Interest;
Restriction is Reasonable in Time
and Space; No Undue Hardship on
Professionals
Employee

Continued
Employment
is Sufficient
Consideration

Enforceable
Against
Discharged
Employees

Yes

Reformation

Yes

Undecided

Reformation

Undecided

Blue Pencil

Undecided

Yes

Factors: Limitations in Time and
Space; Whether Employee Was
Sole Contact with Customer; Employee's Possession of Trade Secrets or Confidential Information;
Whether Restriction Eliminates Unfair or Ordinary Competition;
Whether the Covenant Stifles Employee's Inherent Skill and Experience; Proportionality of Benefit to
Employer and Detriment to EmTrade Secrets; Confi- ployee; Whether Employee's Sole
Means of Support is Barred;
dential Information;
Customer Relationship Whether Employee's Talent Was
(where employee was Developed During Employment;
Whether Forbidden Employment Is
sole contact)
Incidental to the Main Employment.

Yes

No broader than necessary to protect the employer's legitimate
business interest; not unreasonably
Trade Secrets; Confirestrictive; not contrary to public
dential Information;
Customer Relationships policy; ancillary to another conBroadcasters;
tract.
maybe Physicians Yes

-

Reformation
Blue Pencil
Red Pencil

Russell Beck
Beck Reed Riden LLP
1 of 14
155 Federal Street, Suite 1302
8/14/13
Boston, MA 02110
© 2010-2013 Beck Reed Riden LLP
617-500-8670
All Rights Reserved
Published
by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2022
Not Intended As Legal Advice
rbeck@beckreed.com
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State

Permitted

Protectable /
Legitimate
Interests

Standards

Ancillary to Employment Agreement; Protectable Interest; Geographic Reach is not Overly Broad;
Special Training; Trade Reasonable in Time; Not greater
than reasonably necessary and
Secrets; Confidential
Business Information; does not injure a public interest.
Customer Lists

Exemptions

AR

Yes

CA

No, except maybe
as to trade secrets.
Cal. Business &
Professions Code
Trade Secrets
sec. 16600

CO

Yes, as to executive
or management
employees and professional staff; limited as to rest.
Colo. Rev. Stat. sec.
8-2-113.

Trade Secrets; Recovery of Training ExMust fall within statutory exception;
penses for Short- term be reasonable; and be narrowlyEmployees
tailored.

Yes.

Factors: time; geographic reach;
fairness of protection afforded to
Trade Secrets; Confiemployer; extent of restraint on
dential Information;
Customer Relationships employee; extent of interference
with public interest.

Yes

Trade Secrets; ConfiReasonable in time and geographic
reach; protects legitimate economic
dential Information;
Customer Relationships interests; survives balance of equiPhysicians
ties.

CT

DE

Uncertain status as to trade secrets.

Russell Beck
Beck Reed Riden LLP
155 Federal Street, Suite 1302
Boston, MA 02110
617-500-8670
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/231
rbeck@beckreed.com

-

Continued
Employment
is Sufficient
Consideration

Yes

-

-

Broadcasters;
Security Guards

Reformation
Blue Pencil
Red Pencil

Red Pencil

-

Enforceable
Against
Discharged
Employees

Undecided

-

-

Yes

Reformation

Undecided

Yes, likely

Reformation

Yes

Yes

Reformation

Yes

2 of 14
8/14/13
© 2010-2013 Beck Reed Riden LLP
All Rights Reserved
Not Intended As Legal Advice
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State

Permitted

Protectable /
Legitimate
Interests

Yes

FL

Trade secrets; confidential business information; substantial
customer relationships
and goodwill; extraorYes. Fla. Stat. Ann. dinary or specialized
training
Sec. 542.335
Proprietary Confidential
Information and Relationships; Goodwill;
Economic Advantage;
Time and Monetary Investment in Employee's Skill and Training

GA

Yes. Ga. Const.,
Art. III, Sec. VI,
Par. V(c), as
amended.

HI

Trade Secrets; Confidential Information;
Yes. Haw. Rev. Stat. Customer Contacts
sec. 480-4(c)

Yes

Exemptions

Reasonable in time and geographic
area; necessary to protect legitimate business interests; promisee's need outweighs promisor's
Trade secrets; confidential knowledge; ex- hardship. [Follows Restatement
pert training; fruits of (Second) of Contracts, secs. 186Broadcasters
88.]
employment

DC

ID

Standards

Trade Secrets; Confidential Information;
Customer Contacts

Legitimate business interest; reasonably necessary to protect legitimate business interest. [Rebuttal
Mediators
presumptions exist.]

Continued
Employment
is Sufficient
Consideration

Reformation
Blue Pencil
Red Pencil

Enforceable
Against
Discharged
Employees

Likely

Reformation or
Blue Pencil

No

Yes

Reformation
(mandatory)

Undecided

Not overbroad in time, space, and
scope; interest of individuals in
gaining and pursuing a livelihood;
commercial concerns in protecting
legitimate business interests; public
policy.

-

Yes

Reformation

Yes, but it's a
factor to be considered.

Reasonable in time, space, scope.

-

Undecided

Reformation

Undecided

No broader than necessary to protect the employer's legitimate business interest; reasonable as to
covenantor, covenantee, and public; not contrary to public policy.

-

Yes

Reformation

Yes

Russell Beck
Beck Reed Riden LLP
3 of 14
155 Federal Street, Suite 1302
8/14/13
Boston, MA 02110
© 2010-2013 Beck Reed Riden LLP
617-500-8670
All Rights Reserved
Published
by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2022
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State

IL

IN

IA

KS

Protectable /
Legitimate
Interests

Standards

Yes.

Legitimate business interests are based on
the totality of the facts
and circumstances of
the case. Trade secrets,
confidential information, and near
permenant business
relationships are factors.

Ancillary to a valid employment relationship; no greater than required
to protect a legitimate business interest; does not impose undue
hardship on the employee; not injurious to the public; and reasonable in time, space, and scope. [May
require two years of continued employment before any noncompete
can be enforced.]

Yes.

Clear and specific (not general) restraint must be reasonable in light
of the legitimate interests to be
protected; reasonableness is
measured by totality of interrelaTrade Secrets; Confi- tionship of the interest, and the
time, space, and scope of the redential Information;
striction, judged by the needs for
Goodwill; Special
Training or Techniques the restriction, the effect on the
employee, and the public interest.

Permitted

Exemptions

Continued
Employment
is Sufficient
Consideration

Yes (if employment continued
Broadcasters;
Government Con- for sufficient duration)
tractors; Physicians

Reformation
Blue Pencil
Red Pencil

Enforceable
Against
Discharged
Employees

Reformation

Yes

Blue Pencil

Yes

Yes.

Whether the restriction is reasonably necessary to protect the emTrade Secrets; Good- ployer's business, unreasonably re- Franchisees
will; Specialized Train- strictive (time and space), and
(where franchisor
prejudicial to the public interest.
ing
does not renew) Yes

Reformation

Yes, but it's a
factor to be considered.

Yes.

Protects a legitimate business inTrade Secrets; Loss of terest; not undue burden on employee; not injurious to public welClients; Referral
fare; reasonable in time and space. Accountants (limSources; Reputation;
Yes
Special Training
ited)

Reformation

Yes

Russell Beck
Beck Reed Riden LLP
155 Federal Street, Suite 1302
Boston, MA 02110
617-500-8670
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/231
rbeck@beckreed.com

-

Yes

4 of 14
8/14/13
© 2010-2013 Beck Reed Riden LLP
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State

KY

LA

ME

MD

MA

Permitted

Yes.

Yes. La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. Sec. 23:921.

Yes

Yes

Yes

Protectable /
Legitimate
Interests

Standards

Confidential Business
Information; Customer
Lists; Competition;
Employee Raiding; Investment in Training

Reasonable in scope and purpose;
reasonableness determined by the
time, space, and "charter" of the
restriction; no undue hardship;
does not interfere with public interest

Trade Secrets; Financial
Information; Management Techniques; Extensive (Unrecouped
Through Employee's
Work) Training

No more than two years; specifies
the specific geographic reach (by
parishes, municipalities, or their respective parts); defines employer's
business; strict compliance with
statute.

Exemptions

-

Continued
Employment
is Sufficient
Consideration

Yes (if long
enough and employee resigns)

Automobile
Salesman; Real
Estate Broker's
Licensees (procedural requireYes
ments)

Trade Secrets; Confidential Information;
Goodwill

No broader than necessary to protect the employer's legitimate business interest; reasonable as to
time, space, and interests to be
Broadcast Indusprotected; no undue hardship to
try (presumption)
Yes
employee.

Trade Secrets; Routes;
Client Lists; Established
Customer Relationships; Goodwill;
Unique Services

Duration and space no broader
than reasonably necessary to protect legitimate interests; no undue
hardship to employee or public;
ancillary to the employment.

Trade Secrets; Confidential Information;
Goodwill

Narrowly tailored to protect legitimate business interest; limited in
time, space, and scope; consonant
with public policy; harm to employer outweighs harm to employee.

Broadcasters;
Physicians;
Nurses; Social
Workers; Psychologists

Reformation
Blue Pencil
Red Pencil

Reformation

Enforceable
Against
Discharged
Employees

Undecided (but it
can be a factor)

Blue Pencil, if allowed by the
Yes, likely.
noncompete

Reformation

Yes, likely.

Yes

Blue Pencil, but
undecided as to
whether more
flexible

No, likely.

Yes

Reformation

Yes
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State

MI

MN

MS

Permitted

Protectable /
Legitimate
Interests

Standards

Exemptions

Continued
Employment
is Sufficient
Consideration

Reformation
Blue Pencil
Red Pencil

Enforceable
Against
Discharged
Employees

Yes. Mich. Comp.
Laws sec.
445.774a.

Must have an honest and just purpose and to protect legitimate
business interests; reasonable in
Trade Secrets; Confi- time, space, and scope or line of
dential Business Infor- business; not injurious to the public.
mation; Goodwill

-

Yes

Reformation

Yes

Yes

Trade Secrets; Confidential Business Information; Goodwill; Prevention of Unfair Competition

No broader than necessary to protect the employer's legitimate business interest; does not impose unnecessary hardship on employee.

-

No

Reformation

Yes

Yes

Trade Secrets; Confidential Business Information; Goodwill; Ability to Succeed in a
Competitive Market

Reasonableness and specificity of
restriction, primarily, in time and
space; hardship to employer and
employee; public interest.

-

Yes (though
questioned if
employee terminated shortly after)

Reformation

Yes

Reformation

Yes

Trade Secrets; Confidential Business Information; Customer or
Supplier Relationships,
Goodwill, or Loyalty;
Customer Lists; Protection from Unfair Competition; Stability in
the Workforce

MO

Yes. 28 Mo. Stat.
Ann. Sec. 431.202
(related)

MT

Likely confidential information and goodNo. Mont. Code
Ann. Secs. 28-703- will; may be more
05
broad.

Reasonably necessary to protect
legitimate interests; reasonable in
time and space; not an unreasonable restraint on employee; purpose
served; situation of the parties;
limits of the restraint; specialization of the business. [Absence of
legitimate business interest impacts duration, which can be no
Secretaries (limmore than one year.]
ited); Clerks
Yes, generally.
(limited)
Reasonable in time or space; reasonable protection for employer;
does not impose unreasonable burden on the employee or public.

Russell Beck
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Prescott and Starr:

State

Permitted

Protectable /
Legitimate
Interests

Continued
Employment
is Sufficient
Consideration

Reformation
Blue Pencil
Red Pencil

Enforceable
Against
Discharged
Employees

Standards

Exemptions

NE

Yes

Reasonably necessary to protect legitimate interests; not unduly
harsh or oppressive to employee;
not injurious to the public.
Considerations include: inequality
in bargaining power; risk of loss of
customers; extent of participation
in securing and retaining customers; good faith of employer; employee's job, training, health, education, and family needs; current
employment conditions; need for
employee to change his calling or
residence; relation of restriction to
legitimate interest
being protected.

-

Yes

Red Pencil

Undecided

NV

Not greater than reasonably necessary to protect the business and
goodwill of the employer; no undue
hardship on employee. Time and
space are considerations for reaYes. Nev. Rev. Stat.
Trade Secrets; Goodwill sonableness.
sec. 613.200

-

Yes

Reformation

Undecided

NH

Not greater than necessary to protect the employer's legitimate business interests; no undue or disproTrade Secrets; Confi- portionate hardship to employee;
dential Business Infor- not injurious to public interest; emmation; Goodwill; Em- ployee must be given a copy of the
ployee's Special Influ- noncompete in with offer for emence Over the Employ- ployment or change in job classification.
er's Customers

-

Yes

Reformation

Undecided

Yes. RSA 275:70

Trade Secrets; Confidential Information;
Goodwill
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State

NJ

NM

Permitted

Protectable /
Legitimate
Interests

Standards

Yes

Trade Secrets; Confidential Business Information; Goodwill in
Existing Customers;
Preventing Employee
from Working with
Customer at Lower
Cost than Working
through Employer

Protects a legitimate business
interest; not undue burden on
employee; not injurious to the
public; not overbroad in time,
space, and scope.

Yes

Maintaining Workforce;
Limitation of Competition (but not to stifle
competition); Customer Relationships

Reasonable as applied to the employer, employee, and public; not
great hardship to employee in exchange for small benefits to employer.

Trade Secrets; Confidential Information;
Goodwill; On-Air Persona of Broadcasters;
Employee's Unique or
Extraordinary Services

NY

Yes

NC

Yes. N.C. Gen. Stat.
sec. 75-4; 21 N.C.
Admin. Code sec.
Trade Secrets; Confi29.0502(e)(5)
(limitations on
dential Business Inforlocksmiths)
mation; Goodwill

ND

No. N.D. Cent.
Code sec. 9-08-06

Exemptions

In-House Counsel; Psychologists.

Continued
Employment
is Sufficient
Consideration

Reformation
Blue Pencil
Red Pencil

Enforceable
Against
Discharged
Employees

Yes

Reformation

Yes

-

Yes, likely

Undecided

Undecided

Necessary to protect legitimate
business interest; reasonable in
time and space; not harmful to
general public; not unreasonably
burdensome to the employee.

-

Yes

Reformation

Yes, with exceptions.

In writing; part of an employment
contract; reasonably necessary to
protect legitimate business interest; reasonable in time and space;
not against public policy.

-

No

Blue Pencil

Yes, likely.

-

-

-

Russell Beck
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Prescott and Starr:

State

OH
OK

Permitted

Yes
No. Okla Stat. ti.
15, sec. 219A

Protectable /
Legitimate
Interests

Trade Secrets; Confidential Information;
Customer Relationships; Prevention of
the Use of Proprietary
Customer Information
to Solicit Customers

-

Standards

Exemptions

Continued
Employment
is Sufficient
Consideration

Reformation
Blue Pencil
Red Pencil

Enforceable
Against
Discharged
Employees

Not greater than necessary to protect the employer's legitimate business interests; no undue hardship
to employee; not injurious to public
interest. Considerations: absence
or presence of limitations as to
time and space; whether employee
is sole contact with customer; employee's possession of trade secrets
or confidential information; purpose of restriction (elimination of
unfair competition vs. ordinary
competition and whether seeks to
stifle employee's inherent skill and
experience); proportionality of benefit to employer as compared to
the detriment to the employee;
other means of support for employee; when employee's talent
was developed; whether forbidden
employment is merely incidental to
the main employment.
-

-

Yes

Reformation
-
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State

OR

PA

RI

SC

Permitted

Protectable /
Legitimate
Interests

Standards

Noncompete provided at least two
weeks before employment or with
bona fide advancement; employee
meets minimum compensation
threshold; no longer than two
Trade Secrets; Confiyears; restricted in time or space;
dential Business or
application of restriction should afProfessional Information; Investment in ford only a fair protection of the
Certain On-Air Broad- employer's interests; must not interfere with public interest. [Qualicasters; Customer
Yes. Or. Rev. Stat. Contacts and Goodwill fying garden leave clauses are enforceable.]
sec. 653.295

Yes

Trade Secrets; Confidential Information;
Goodwill; Investment
in Specialized Training;
Unique or Extraordinary
Skills

Ancillary to employment relation or
other transaction; reasonably necessary to protect the employer's legitimate interests; reasonable in
time and space.

Yes

Trade Secrets; Confidential Information;
Customer Lists; Goodwill; Special Training or Reasonable in light of protectable
Skills
interests.

Yes

Necessary to protect legitimate
business interest; reasonably limBusiness and Customer ited in time and space; not unduly
Contacts; Existing Em- harsh and oppressive to employployees; Existing Pay- ee's efforts to earn a living; reasonable from standpoint of public
roll Deduction Acpolicy.
counts.
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Exemptions

-

-

-

-

Continued
Employment
is Sufficient
Consideration

No.

Reformation
Blue Pencil
Red Pencil

Enforceable
Against
Discharged
Employees

Reformation

Undecided

No

Reformation

Yes, but it's a
factor to be considered.

Undecided

Blue Pencil, but
may allow ReforUndecided
mation

No
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Red Pencil, likely.
(SC S.Ct rejected
blue pencil doctrine by name,
but case involved
reformation.)

Undecided
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Prescott and Starr:

State

SD

TN

TX

Permitted

Yes. S.D. Codified
Laws sec. 53-9-8,
et seq.

Yes

Yes. Tex. Bus. &
Com. Code secs.
15.50-.52

Protectable /
Legitimate
Interests

Standards

Restriction is in the same business
or profession as that carried on by
employer and does not exceed two
Trade Secrets; Protec- years and in a specified geographic
tion from Unfair Com- area; reasonableness in time,
petition; Existing Cus- space, and scope is a factor only in
certain circumstances.
tomers
Trade Secrets; Confidential Information;
Retention of Existing
Customers; Investment
in Training or Enhancing the Employee's
Skill and Experience

Restriction must be reasonable in
time and space and necessary to
protect legitimate interest; public
interest no adversely affected; no
undue hardship to the employee.

Exemptions

-

Physicians (in
certain circumstances).

Ancillary to an otherwise enforceable agreement; reasonable in time,
space, and scope; does not impose
a greater restraint than necessary
to protect legitimate business interest. *In December 2011, the Texas
Supreme Court withdrew its June
2011 landmark decision, but still
eliminated the requirement that the
consideration given by the employer in exchange for the noncomTrade Secrets; Confi- pete must give rise to the interest
protected by the noncompete, and
dential or Proprietary
Information; Goodwill; held that the consideration for the
noncompete agreement must be
Special Training or
reasonably related to the compaKnowledge Acquired
Physicians (in
ny's interest sought to be proDuring Employment;
certain circumtected.
stances).

Continued
Employment
is Sufficient
Consideration

Yes

Yes (if employment continued
for appreciably
long period)

No
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Reformation
Blue Pencil
Red Pencil

Enforceable
Against
Discharged
Employees

Reformation,
likely.

Yes, but it's a
factor to be considered.

Reformation

Undecided

Reformation
(mandatory)

Yes
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State

UT

VT

Permitted

Yes

Yes

Protectable /
Legitimate
Interests

Standards

Exemptions

Trade Secrets; Goodwill; Extraordinary Investment in Training or
Education

No bad faith in the negotiations;
necessary to protect legitimate
business interest; reasonable in
time, space, and scope; consideration of hardship.

-

Proprietary Confidential
Information; Goodwill;
Relationships with Customers; Investments in
Special Training
Trade Secrets; Confidential Information;
Knowledge of Methods
of Operation; Protection from Detrimental
Competition; Customer
Contacts

VA

WA

Yes

Yes

Continued
Employment
is Sufficient
Consideration

Yes

Reformation
Blue Pencil
Red Pencil

Enforceable
Against
Discharged
Employees

Undecided

Yes

Necessary to protect legitimate
business interest; not unnecessarily
restrictive to employee; limited in Beauticians and
time, space, and/or industry; not
Cosmetologists
contrary to public policy.
(by their school)

Yes

Undecided

Yes, but it's a
factor to be considered.

No broader than necessary to protect the employer's legitimate business interest; reasonable in time,
space, and scope; not unduly
harsh in curtailing employee's ability to earn a living; reasonable in
terms of public policy.

Yes

Red Pencil

Yes

No

Reformation

Yes, likely.

-

Restriction is necessary to protect
employer's business or goodwill;
restriction is no greater than reasonably necessary to secure employer's business or goodwill; reasonable in time and space; injury
Broadcasters
Customer Information to public does not outweigh benefit (under certain
and Contacts; Goodwill to employer.
circumstances)
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Prescott and Starr:

State

WV

WI

WY

Permitted

Yes

Protectable /
Legitimate
Interests
Trade Secrets; Confidential or Unique Information; Customer
Lists; Direct Investment in Employee's
Skills; Goodwill

Standards

Exemptions

Ancillary to a lawful contract; not
greater than reasonably necessary
to protect legitimate business interest; reasonable in time and
space; no undue hardship on employee; not injurious to public.

-

Necessary to protect legitimate
business interest; reasonable in
time and space; not harsh or oppressive to the employee; not contrary to public policy.

Yes. Wis. Stat.
Ann. Sec. 103.465

Trade Secrets; Confidential Business Information; Customer Relationships.

Yes.

Restraint must be ancillary to otherwise valid agreement and fair; no
Trade Secrets; Confi- greater than necessary to protect
legitimate business interests; readential Information;
sonable in time and space; no unSpecial Influence of
due hardship on employee; emEmployee Over Cusployer's need outweighs harm to
tomers to the Extent
Gained During Employ- employee and public; not injurious
to public.
ment

Continued
Employment
is Sufficient
Consideration

Reformation
Blue Pencil
Red Pencil

Enforceable
Against
Discharged
Employees

No, likely.

Reformation

-

No, likely.

All or nothing.
But, recent case
law may suggest
a judicial move
toward a more
tolerant approach. See Star
Direct, Inc.
v. Dal Pra, 767
N.W.2d 898 (Wis.
Undecided
2009).

-

No

Reformation
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Undecided

Yes, likely.
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State

Permitted

Protectable /
Legitimate
Interests

Customer lists are frequently considered
trade secrets or confidential information.
Some states, however,
separately identify
them as protectable
interests.
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Standards

Exemptions

Attorneys and
certain persons in
the financial serConsideration for the noncompete vices industry are
subject to indusis always a requirement. That requirement is not typically an issue try regulations
not addressed in
when the agreement is entered
into at the inception of an employ- this chart.
ment relationship.

Continued
Employment
is Sufficient
Consideration

Reformation
Blue Pencil
Red Pencil

Reformation is
also sometimes
called "Judicial
Modification," the
"Rule of Reasonableness," the
"Reasonable Alteration Approach," or the
"Partial- Enforcement" rule. Red
The continued
employment issue Pencil is also
addresses only at- sometimes called
will employment the "All or Nothing" rule.
relationships.
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Enforceable
Against
Discharged
Employees

Assumes no
breach or bad
faith by the employer.
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